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I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
A. Scope, Purpose, and Statement of the Problem
This article compares Article II of the 1990 Uniform Probate
Code,' as embodied in House Bill 1020 and Senate Bill 598,2 with
1. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, OFFICIAL 1993 TEXT WITH COMMENTS (11th ed.
1994).
2. Except as noted, all references are to the version of the Uniform Probate
Code introduced in the 1995 Arkansas State Legislative Session as H.B. 1020. As
originally introduced into the 1995 Arkansas Legislative Session, H.B. 1020 and
S.B. 598 were substantially a copy of the 1990 Uniform Probate Code (U.P.C.).
For convenience all references to this bill will be to the U.P.C. and the last four
numbers of the section, i.e., U.P.C. § 0-000 (1990) (amended 1993). Conversion
to H.B. 1020 is made merely by adding the prefix "28-" to the reference.
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existing Arkansas law.3 Although Article II did not pass both houses,
it is expected that it will be studied by bar committees for introduction
into the 1997 legislature. Because of the pendency of this matter,
the authors believed that a section by section comparison between
the Uniform Probate Code and Arkansas law would be useful to
lawyers, legislators, and others interested in probate law.
4
Article II contains twenty-three percent of the sections in the
Code which makes it the second largest article. It includes the
substantive core of what is referred to as the law of wills, intestate
succession, and donative transfers. In addition to provisions dealing
with how to execute a will and distribution under intestacy, it also
includes provisions concerning the surviving spouse's elective share,
family protections, rules of construction for wills and other donative
instruments, disclaimers, the safekeeping of wills, the Rule Against
Perpetuities, and other related matters.5 This coverage constitutes a
significant portion of the law of gratuitous wealth transfer.
6
The general public's perception of the word "probate ' 7 is that
it refers to a system reeking with unnecessary costs and delays. The
resultant cry has been "avoid probate."' Several successful com-
mercial enterprises have been launched from this conceptual pad
3. All references are to the latest version of the section as printed in ARKANSAS
CODE OF 1987 ANNOTATED and its supplements. For convenience, the format will
merely refer to the numbers of the section, i.e., ARK. CODE ANN. § 00-00-000
(Michie 1987).
4. In 1980, a similar article was published comparing the original version of
Article II of the Code with Arkansas law. Ellen B. Brantley & Richard W. Effland,
Inheritance, the Share of the Surviving Spouse, and Wills: Arkansas Law and the
Uniform Probate Code Compared, 3 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 361 (1980). Since
that time, the Code has gone through a major revision of Article II and H.B.
1020 incorporates these changes. Although Arkansas law has changed to a small
UCgCC, it remains "vcry mfuc the same.
5. U.P.C., art. II, prefatory note at 41 (1990). Substantial portions of this
article discussing the analysis of Article II of the Code appear in the author's text
on the entire Uniform Probate Code, LAWRENCE H. AVERIL, JR., UNIFORM PROBATE
CODE IN A NUTSHELL (3d ed. 1993).
6. The Code and H.B. 1020 cover many other areas as well, e.g., the ad-
ministration of decedents' estates, guardianship, survivorship accounts. It is beyond
the scope of this article to deal with those matters. For a comprehensive review
of the entire Code, see AVERML, supra note 5.
7. Technically, "probate" refers to the process of proving and deciding the
validity of a will before a court having competent jurisdiction; more generally, it
refers to all matters appropriately before the probate courts. BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 1202 (6th ed. 1991).
8. Professor Langbein contends that this is what is happening. See John H.
Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession,
97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1136 (1984).
[Vol. 17:631
1995] ARKANSAS LAW AND UPC COMPARISON 635
and they accuse the legal profession of perpetrating and perpetuating
this undesirable situation. 9
The source of much of the present dissatisfaction is in the laws
themselves. First, there is insufficient uniformity between the laws
of the fifty states. This fact may cause not only unjust results but
also an inherent confusion and distrust among a very mobile lay
populace. Second, some of the relevant laws in this area in many
states are not contemporary; consequently, they do not take into
account the material changes that have occurred in our society. Not
only have we changed from a primarily rural to a primarily urban
society, but also from one with a primary emphasis directed to
ownership of real estate to one directed toward ownership of personal
property and other contractual relationships. Furthermore, our society
continues to progress from one educationally and sociologically pro-
vincial to one nationally and even internationally cognizant. The
continued increase in the number of persons who have had multiple
marriages and who have had children with more than a single spouse
creates a social phenomenon that current succession law does not
adequately address. 0 Many of the present laws on these matters,
Aherefore, do not adequately deal with the primary problems posed
by the average person in the succession of wealth at death or in
the management of that person's property during disability.
B. A Short History of the Uniform Probate Code"
In 1940, Professor Thomas E. Atkinson suggested to the American
Bar Association Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law
(hereinafter referred to as the Probate Section) that this organization
9. E.g., M. BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS, ch. 11, pp. 233-63 (1968)
(Chapter 11 is entitled "Our Unknown Heirs" and is concerned with attorney fees);
NORMAN F. DACEY, HOW TO AvoD PROBATE (5th ed. 1993). The Dacey book is
still in print and claims it has sold over 1.5 million copies. Probate avoidance
books are still popular. See, e.g., ROBERT A. ESPERTI & RENNO L. PETERSON,
LOVING TRUST (1991); HENRY W. ABTS, THE LIVING TRUST (1989); Louis AUSTIN,
THE LIVING TRUST ALTERNATIVE (1988).
10. This trend is one of the themes set out as a principal reason for the
substantial alteration to Article II. U.P.C., art. II, prefatory note at 40 (1990)
(amended 1993).
11. Substantial portions of the following history appear in three of the author's
previous publications. See AVERILL, supra note 5; Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., An
Eclectic History and Analysis of the 1990 Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REV.
891-926 (1992); Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., Wyoming's Law of Decedents' Estates,
Guardianship and Trusts: A Comparison with the Uniform Probate Code (part 1),
7 LAND & WATER L. REV. 169 (1972).
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prepare a Model Probate Code. 2 This idea resulted in the publication
of a Model Probate Code and accompanying studies in 1946.11
Although the Model Probate Code had a direct influence and effect
on revisions in several states, it had neither the comprehensiveness
nor the impetus to influence a majority of states to adopt it.
In 1963, the Probate Section and the National Conference accepted
a suggestion made by J. Pennington Straus of the Philadelphia Bar
to revise and consolidate the Model Probate Code and other related
and relevant uniform laws into a uniform probate law. In response,
each organization formed a separate committee and Professor William
F. Fratcher of the University of Missouri School of Law was appointed
Research Director to conduct preliminary studies during 1963-64.
Thereafter, a Reporting Staff was recruited to draft the Uniform
Probate Code under the supervision of the two committees. Professor
Richard V. Wellman, then of the University of Michigan and now
of the University of Georgia, became the Reporting Staff's Chief
Reporter.
After six drafts and six years of extensive research, consultation,
and discussion, an official text was approved in August 1969, by
the National Conference and by the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association. Although inspired and initiated as a
project to redraft and update the Model Probate Code, the eventual
finished product turned out to be much more. It not only was more
comprehensive in coverage but also exhibited greater innovation and
imagination. In addition, many of its basic philosophies were different.
Consequently, the Code offered a more viable package for influencing
and affecting modern probate legislation. 4
In March of 1971, Idaho became the first state to adopt the
Code substantially in whole. 5 Since that time, more than thirty
percent of the fifty states have enacted laws which substantially
con1form to the Code or p-'.t of it.16
12. Thomas E. Atkinson, Wanted-A Model Probate Code, 23 J. AM. JUR.
Soc'Y 183, 189 (1940). See also, Thomas E. Atkinson, Old Principles and New
Ideas Concerning Probate Court Procedure, 23 J. AM. JUR. Soc'Y 137 (1939).
13. LEwis M. SIMES & PAUL E. BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW-INCLUDING
A MODEL PROBATE CODE (1946).
14. Naturally, through the last twenty years the Code has been the subject of
a great deal of legal commentary. One of the most important publications was the
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL published by the Association of Con-
tinuing Legal Education Administrators in 1972 and edited by Professor Robert
R. Wright. ACLEA, UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL (1972). It contained
a series of articles by recognized authorities on all parts of the Code. It has never
been kept up-to-date.
15. IDAHO CODE §§ 15-1-101 to -401 (1972) (effective July 1, 1972).
16. See U.P.C., 8 U.L.A. 1-4 (Supp. 1995).
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C. Uniform Probate Code Maintenance Efforts
For the purpose of promulgating the Uniform Probate Code,
a Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code (hereinafter
referred to as the Editorial Board) was established in 1970. Its
membership now consists of three persons selected by the National
Conference, three members chosen by the Probate Section, three
members of the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel, two
Liaison-Law School Teachers, one Liaison-Probate Judge, the
Executive Director, and the Director of Research. 7 The Editorial
Board's responsibilities are: (a) to monitor literature dealing with
the Code; (b) to watch for problems that develop in the Code itself
and that arise in states which have enacted or are considering enacting
the Code; (c) to educate the Bar and the public about the Code;
and, (d) to reevaluate, alter, and edit the Code's text for the purpose
of removing imperfections and improving content, both substantially
and editorially.' 8
With all of this supervision and support, the Code was frequently
updated and improved. During 1975-76, the National Conference
and the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association approved
significant amendments called the "1975 Technical Amendments"
promulgated by the Joint Editorial Board. Many of these amendments
included suggestions and improvements made by various bar
committees that have studied the Code for enactment in their respective
states. Other alterations were made in 1977, 1979, 1982, 1984, 1987,
1988, and 1989.19 In 1990, the National Conference again approved
a revision which substantially altered Article II. The process never
stops. In 1993, a significant reorganization of the Code's elective
share provisions was approved.
The influence and use of the Code are growing in a variety of
ways.20 The laws of nearly all, if not all, states have been affected
by the Code. The primary vehicles of influence are as follows: (1)
Enactment as a Code in full with some amendments. Fifteen states
17. See U.P.C., at vi-vii (1990).
18. "Joint Editorial Board," 1 U.P.C. NOTES 2 (July 1972). Professor Dick
Wellman was named as its first Educational Director. Professor Wellman continued
to promote and advocate both the enactment of the Code and its continual
improvement. One of the most important developments in the past several years
was the recruitment and appointment of Professors John Langbein and Lawrence
Waggoner to the Editorial Board and as Director of Research, respectively.
19. See U.P.C., at xi (1990).
20. See Roger W. Andersen, The Influence of the Uniform Probate Code in
Nonadopting States, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 599 (1985).
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fall into this category: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii,
Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New
Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, and Utah. 21 (2) Piece-meal
enactment of segments or sections of the Code for inclusion into
another probate code or law. Nearly all the other states have enacted
some part or section of the Code. Sections of Article II have been
particularly popular. For example, California incorporated many
provisions of the Code, in whole or in part, into its recent revision
of its probate code. In order to assure proper judicial construction
of these Code provisions, the new law requires that any portion of
the California code that is derived "in substance" from the Uniform
Probate Code must be "construed as to effectuate the general purpose
to make uniform the law in those states which enact" provisions
of the Uniform Probate Code.22 (3) Referral as a model of modern
policy by a court interpreting its own non-Code provision. 23 (4)
Referral as secondary or persuasive authority for determining proper
rules of construction for the common law. 24
Even if comprehensive enactment does not continue, the Code's
influence over the law of probate and related matters will continue
to increase.
D. A Short History of the Arkansas Probate Code
Arkansas's law of wills, intestate succession, and probate was
enacted in more or less its current form in 1949.25 The 1949 Code,
which was the product of a committee of the Arkansas Bar
Association, did not change the substantive law of wills and intestate
succession, but it substantially reformed probate procedure. 26
In 1969, again at the urging of a committee of the Arkansas
Bar Association, the General Assembly adopted a substantial revision
of the probate code. 27 This enactment was influenced to some degree
21. U.P.C., 8 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1995). For articles comparing the Code to the
various state enactments, see Richard V. Wellman & James W. Gordon, Uniformity
in State Inheritance Laws: How U.P.C. Article II Has Fared in Nine Enactments,
1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 357; Richard V. Wellman & James W. Gordon, The Uniform
Probate Code: Article 111 Analyzed in Relation to Changes in the First Nine
Enactments, 1975 ARiz. ST. L.J. 477.
22. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2(b) (West 1991).
23. See, e.g., First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Watson, 239 So. 2d 194 (Ala.
1970).
24. See, e.g., Russell v. Estate of Russell, 534 P.2d 261 (Kan. 1975); Estate
of Thompson v. Potts, 423 N.E.2d 90 (Ohio 1981); Smith v. Smith, 519 S.W.2d
152 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
25. 1949 ARK. ACTS 140.
26. See ACTS OF 1949 GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 3 ARK. L. REV. 351, 375 (1949).
27. 1969 ARK. ACTS 303.
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by the Uniform Probate Code in its current form, the Third Working
Draft, but the Act did not follow the Code in most respects. 28
Since 1969, there have been a number of revisions, but none
of a general nature. In 1981, the laws of dower and curtesy were
revised in response to a decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court. 29
The two estates had differed in some respects before 1981 and the
General Assembly modified the law to make curtesy available under
the same terms as dower.30 Other revisions were directly from the
Uniform Probate Code. For example, Arkansas adopted the provision
allowing disposition of tangible personal property by an unwitnessed
writing directly from section 2-513 of the original Uniform Probate
Code.3 1
II. INTESTATE SUCCESSION
A. General Principles of Intestacy
Studies indicate that a substantial percentage of persons who
have accumulated wealth during their lifetime die without creating
comprehensive inter vivos arrangements and without making effective
testamentary instruments for the disposition of their property. 32 When
this happens, the decedent's property passes by intestate succession
according to a statutory estate plan. 33
A commonly expressed purpose for intestate succession statutes
is to distribute a decedent's wealth in a pattern that represents a
close approximation of that which an average person would have
designed had that person's desires been properly manifested. 34
28. Robert R. Wright, The New Arkansas Inheritance Laws: A Step Into the
Present with an Eye to the Future, 23 ARK. L. REV. 313 (1969).
29. Stokes v. Stokes, 271 Ark. 300, 613 S.W.2d 372 (1981) (applying Orr v.
Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979)).
30. 1981 ARK. ACTS 714.
31. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-107(b) (Michie 1987).
32. See Mary L. Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution
at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 319, 336-39. This study, conducted by telephone in a five state area,
indicated that the older one is more likely to have a will. Although on average
nearly 55% of the respondents did not have a will, the percentage decreased as
the age of the respondents increased. Consequently, the percentage of persons who
die without a Will is probably less than 40%. Even so, this constitutes a large
number of persons.
33. THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 1, at 4 (2d ed.
1953).
34. U.P.C., art. II, app. A, pt. 1, cmt. at 523. See King v. Riffee, 309 S.E.2d
85 (W. Va. 1983). The court states:
Our laws concerning intestate succession are designed to effect the orderly
639
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In addition, the legislature's perspective as to how inheritances
should be distributed is significant.35 Obviously, to accomplish this
task on a general basis, legislatures have developed objective rather
than subjective programs that are necessarily subject to debate.
Furthermore, any legislation on this matter naturally reflects the
attitudes of the legislature of that moment under its contemporary
societal ideals and policies. Attitudes change, of course, as these
ideals and policies change.
Intestate inheritance is recognized by all fifty states and terri-
tories. The standard intestacy statute specifically apportions the in-
testate's property among a list of prioritized relatives.16 The surviving
spouse, descendants, and parents of the intestate are the standard
preferred beneficiaries.3 7 In varying degrees, other ancestors and
collateral relations are also protected after the preferred relations .3
Except for the surviving spouse, inheritance is usually limited to
consanguine relations. 39 Occasionally, the surviving spouse's consan-
guine relations may take if the decedent's consanguine relations
cannot .0
The relational range of consanguinity necessary in order to take
in intestacy varies among the states. Most intestacy statutes protect
consanguine relations through grandparents and their descendants. 4'
Some even make no express relational cutoff point and if the specified
relations in the statute cannot take, the intestate's estate passes to
the determinable nearest of kin.42 All states recognize that the prop-
erty escheats to the state if no one qualified under the intestacy
provisions can take.
In recent times when intestacy statutes have been the subject
of legislative reform, several policy disputes have arisen. A policy
controversy usually relates to the share that the surviving spouse
distribution of property for decedents who lacked either the foresight or
the diligence to make wills. The purpose of these statutes, then, is to
provide a distribution of real and personal property that approximates
what decedents would have done if they had made a will.
Id. at 87-88.
35. Other purposes include the financial protection and social encouragement
of the nuclear family, the efficient transfer of titled property, and the promotion
of wealth accumulation. Fellows, supra note 32, at 324.
36. Arkansas's statute is a typical example. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-214
(Michie 1987).
37. Id. §§ 28-9-214(1) to -214(3).
38. Id. §§ 28-9-214(5) to -214(7).
39. Consanguine relations are those related by blood, as opposed to relations
by marriage. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 303 (6th ed. 1991).
40. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-215 (Michie 1987).
41. For an example see ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-214(6) (Michie 1987).
42. For an example see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190, § 3(6) (West 1981).
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takes when there are surviving descendants of the intestate or when
there are no surviving descendants but other consanguine relatives
of the decedent survive. Many persons have urged that the share
of the surviving spouse be enlarged from the share currently provided
in many states, including Arkansas.4 3
B. Share of the Surviving Spouse When the Decedent Is
Survived by Children
When the decedent is survived by children, the surviving spouse
is not even an "heir" under the Arkansas Table of Descent and
Distribution, but takes only dower. 44 Dower has been statutorily
modified in Arkansas. Where the decedent leaves children, dower
in land gives a surviving spouse a life interest in one-third of all
real estate the decedent owned during the marriage and one-third
in fee simple of all personal property which the decedent owned at
death. 45
The inadequacy of the shares under Arkansas law is manifest
not only by comparison with the testamentary schemes adopted by
those who make wills, but also by the fact that these are the same
shares that a surviving spouse' takes if the decedent spouse intends
to disinherit the spouse.
Under the Code, the surviving spouse is a primary beneficiary
in intestacy.4 6 When children of the decedent survive, the surviving
spouse inherits as follows: (1) If the decedent is also survived by
children who are all children of the decedent and the spouse, the
surviving spouse takes all the intestate estate.4 7 (2) If the decedent
is survived by one or more descendants who are also descendants
of the surviving spouse and by descendants who are not descendants
of the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse takes the first $150,000
of the net estate plus one-half of anything exceeding that amount
remaining in the estate. 48 (3) If decedent is not survived by one or
more descendants who are also descendants of the surviving spouse,
43. Unfortunately, Arkansas's highly complex scheme for calculating the share
of the surviving spouse, allots only a small share to the spouse if the children
survive. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-214 (Michie 1987).
44. Id. § 28-9-214(1).
45. Id. §§ 28-11-301, -305 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1993).
46. U.P.C. § 2-102 (1990) (amended 1993).
47. Id. § 2-102(1).
48. Id. § 2-102(3).
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but is survived by. one or more descendants who are not descendants
of the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse takes the first $100,000
of the net estate, plus one-half of anything exceeding that amount
in the estate. 49 (4) Dower is abolished.50
The approach to the first situation is derived from several studies
that indicate testators usually follow this approach in their wills.
The second and third situations address the phenomenon of the
growing numbers of multi-relationship children; consequently, the
Code reduces the share of a surviving spouse in order to provide
for descendants who are not the surviving spouse's descendants. The
Code approach gives limited protection in relatively large estates to
decedent's descendants of relationships other than the one existing
at death. Notwithstanding the reduction, the share of the surviving
spouse is substantial. The abolition of dower is appropriate in a
modern society that treats spouses as economic and social equals.5
Dower is an anachronistic concept that has no relevance to the reality
of the modern economic world. 2
49. Id. § 2-102(4).
50. Id. § 2-112.
51. Arkansas is one of less than five states that retain dower as a primary
measure of a surviving spouses' rights against a decedent's real property. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 34.1 n.6 (1992). The Restatement lists five
states, Arkansas, District of Columbia, Kentucky, Ohio, and West Virginia. West
Virginia recently repealed dower, substituting the Code's augmented estate concept.
W. VA. CODE § 43-1-1 (Supp. 1994). See discussion concerning whether dower is
needed, infra note 52.
52. The debate over whether there is some residual merit in a dower concept
reached full discussion in the efforts to change spousal protection methods in West
Virginia. Professor Fisher noted that the proponents for dower contend that other
spousal protection methods do not fully protect the surviving spouse and that dower
has protections that do. He observed:
Howcvcr, when the Advisory Com;itte discussed the proposal to abolish
dower as a part of the proposed statute, some members of the committee
objected. It was not the at-death "benefits" of dower the objectors wished
to preserve, but rather the marital leverage it provided. These members
of the Advisory Committee were concerned that if dower were abolished
it would make it easier for a title holder of real property to sell the
property in anticipation of divorce and "hide" the replacement asset from
her or his spouse. Since a prudent purchaser would not accept a deed
from the title holding spouse without the signature of the non-title holding
spouse, inchoate dower "forced" the title holding spouse to obtain the
non-title holding spouse's signature to release dower rights. Obviously,
acquiring the non-title holding spouse's signature would make that spouse
aware of the conveyance.
John W. Fisher, II, Statutory Reform Revisited: Toward A Comprehensive Un-
derstanding Of The New Law Of Intestate Succession And Elective Share, 96 W.
VA. L. REV. 85, 91 (1993). In response, West Virginia, in repealing dower, enacted
a substitute provision that was intended to protect the above rights for a surviving
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The current Arkansas intestacy provisions fail to accomplish the
goal of intestacy law when there is a surviving spouse. Surely a
statute which presumes the average intestate would wish to leave
his or her spouse the absolute minimum the law allows is not in
accord with the intent of most persons.
C. When the Decedent Leaves a Surviving Spouse But No
Descendants
Under Arkansas's dower provisions, a surviving spouse receives
an absolute interest in one-half of real estate, provided it is a new
acquisition, and one-half of personalty. 53 These proportions are against
other heirs; the spouse's share is reduced to one-third as against
creditors.5 4 In ancestral real property, the surviving spouse takes a
life estate in one-half of the property." Again, this share is only a
one-third life estate vis d vis crediiors.56
spouse. W. VA. CODE § 43-1-2 (Supp. 1994). Despite the obvious title problems
this statute creates, it constituted a reasonable legislative compromise: the state
obtained a modern spousal protection process and the dower advocates retained
the residual protection they desired. This section provides:
§ 43-1-2. Notice of conveyance.
(a) For purposes of this section, "conveyance" means a dispositive act
intended to create a property interest in land and includes the creation
of a security interest in real estate.
(b) Any married person who conveys an interest in real estate shall
notify her or his spouse prior to or within thirty days of the time of the
conveyance if the conveyance involves an interest in real estate to which
dower would have attached if the conveyance had been made prior to the
date of enactment of this statute.
(c) A person making a conveyance described in the previous sections
shall have the burden of proof to show compliance with this section. Such
burden shall be met either by:
(1) The signature of the spouse of the conveying party on the conveyance
instrument; or
(2) Such other forms of competent evidence as are admissible in a court
of general jurisdiction in this state under the rules of evidence.
(d) When a married person fails to comply with the notification re-
quirements of this section, then in the event of a subsequent divorce within
five years of said conveyance, the value of the real estate conveyed, as
determined at the time of the conveyance, shall be deemed a part of the
conveyancer's marital property for purposes of determining equitable dis-
tribution or awards of support, notwithstanding that any consideration
for said interest in the real estate may already be included in the marital
property.
(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed to create a lien or claim
against the interest in real estate conveyed in violations of this provision.
W. VA. CODE § 43-1-2 (Supp. 1994)
53. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-11-307 (Michie 1987).
54. Id.
55. Id. § 28-11-307(b).
56. Id.
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In this situation the surviving spouse is also an heir under the
Table of Descent and Distribution and takes a share in addition to
dower.17 Where the surviving spouse and the decedent have been
married for three years or more, the surviving spouse takes the
entire estate. 8
Where the couple was married less than three years, the surviving
spouse, takes one-half of the remainder of the estate, with the other
one-half going to surviving parents or parent; or, if none, to the
decedent's brothers and sisters or their descendants; or if none
survive, to grandparents and aunts and uncles, or their descendants;
or if none survive, to great-grandparents and great-aunts and great-
uncles, or their descendants. 9 If none of the above relatives survive,
the surviving spouse, although married to the decedent for less than
three years, takes the remainder of the estate in preference to
escheat .60
This terribly elaborate scheme of dower and curtesy is not often
used since calculation is necessary only when the decedent leaves no
issue, but does leave a surviving spouse to whom he or she has
been married for less than three years. Nevertheless, it is cumbersome
and clearly does not comport with the intent of the average decedent
in that it allows even a very distant relative to receive a portion of
the estate in preference to a surviving spouse of less than three
years.
Under the Code, when there are not surviving descendants, a
surviving spouse takes: (1) the first $200,000 of the net estate plus
three-fourths of anything exceeding that amount in the event one
or more of decedent's parents survive;6' (2) all the estate, if the
decedent is not survived by parents regardless of whether other blood
relations of the decedent survive.62
The large monetary prioritized amount ensures that surviving
spouses will take the entire estate in most cases. The surviving spouse
should take it all if no descendants or parents survive. This pattern
is more in line with what most decedents would want. 63 The surviving
56. Id.
57. Id. §§ 28-9-214(2) to -214(4).
58. Id. § 28-9-214(2).
59. Id. § 28-9-214(4).
60. Id. § 28-9-215(1).
61. U.P.C. § 2-102(2) (1990) (amended 1993).
62. Id. § 2-102(1)(i).
63. See Fellows, supra note 32, at 355-68.
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spouse is guaranteed a large inheritance in large estates and all the
inheritance in small estates.6
D. When the Decedent Leaves Descendants But No Surviving
Spouse
Under both Arkansas law65 and the Code,6 the entire estate
passes to the decedent's descendants. This is in line with the law
of intestacy in all states.
67
E. When the Decedent Leaves No Descendants and No
Surviving Spouse
Under Arkansas law, the Table of Descent includes the following
elaborate list of alternatives:6 (1) The entire net estate passes to the
decedent's parents equally or if only one survives, to the survivor; 69
(2) If both parents fail to survive, the estate passes to brothers and
sisters of the decedent and their descendants, by representation; 70
(3) If all the above fail to survive, the entire net estate passes to
the decedent's surviving grandparents, uncles and aunts or their
descendants, by representation; 7' (4) If all the above fail to survive,
the entire net estate passes to great-grandparents and great-aunts
and great-uncles or their descendants, by representation. Each member
of the class or his or her representative descendant receives an equal
share; 72 (5) If all the above fail to survive, the property passes to
the surviving spouse of less than three years; 73 (6) If there is no
surviving spouse, the property passes to the "heirs, determined as
of the date of the intestate's death, . . . of the intestate's deceased
spouse."; 74 (7) If none of the above survive, the estate escheats to
the county in which the decedent resided. 75
Under the Code, if no spouse or descendants survive, the
distribution is made according to specified relationships to the decedent
64. U.P.C. § 2-102 (1990) (amended 1993). The Code approach guarantees the
surviving spouse at least the first $100,000 of any estate. See id. § 2-104(4).
65. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-214(1) (Michie 1987).
66. U.P.C. § 2-103(1) (1990) (amended 1993).
67. ATKINSON, supra note 33, § 16, at 64.
68. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-214 (Michie 1987).
69. Id. § 28-9-214(3).
70. Id. § 28-9-214(5).
71. Id. § 28-9-214(6).
72. Id. § 28-9-214(7).
73. Id. § 28-9-215.
74. Id. § 28-9-215(2). It is unusual but not unique that relations of a predeceased
spouse could take from a decedent's estate, but it is a last resort type provision.
75. Id. § 28-9-215(3); see id. §§ 2-13-101 to -112.
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as follows: 76 (1) The entire net estate passes to the decedent's parents
equally or, if only one survives, to the survivor. 77 (2) If all parents
also fail to survive, the entire net estate passes to their descendants
by representation. 78 (3) If all the above fail to survive, the entire
net estate passes to the decedent's grandparents or their descendants
by representation. 79 (4) Grandparental shares are divided into maternal
and paternal categories if one or more appropriate persons in both
categories survive the decedent.80 (5) One-half passes to the maternal
grandparents or their descendants by representation and the other
one-half passes to the paternal grandparents or their descendants by
representation.8' (6) All surviving grandparents share equally the share
passing in the appropriate category.12 (7) Any surviving grandparent
in either category takes to the exclusion of any surviving descendants
of either grandparent in that category.83 (8)-If no grandparent survives
in one category, the share of that category passes to the descendants
of both grandparents in that category.8 4 (9) If no grandparent or
descendants of a grandparent survive in one category, the share for
that category passes in a similar manner to the grandparents or
their descendants by representation in the other category.8"
Comparison: A difference between the two schemes can be
illustrated by an example. Decedent dies, leaving only a first cousin
on the maternal side and a grandmother and three great-aunts on
the paternal side. Under the Code, the first cousin (issue of a
grandparent) receives one-half of the estate, and the paternal
grandmother receives the other one-half. Under current Arkansas
law, each survivor would receive one-fifth. While there is no evidence
as to which scheme the "average" intestate would prefer, it seems
fair to hypothesize that the average testator would prefer grandparents
to more remote relatives such as aunts and cousins. Therefore, the
Code scheme is preferable. In fact, the Arkansas scheme is highly
unusual in that it allows more remote relatives (uncles and aunts)
to inherit along with living relatives closer in degree (grandparents).
76. U.P.C. § 2-103 (1990) (amended 1993).
77. Id. § 2-103(2).
78. Id. § 2-103(3).
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F. Escheat
As indicated above, in Arkansas, if no spouse, great-grandparents,
issue of great-grandparents, nor relatives of a predeceased spouse
survives the decedent, the property escheats to the county (state).8 6
Under the Code, if there are no spouse and no grandparents or
issue of grandparents, the property escheats to the state. 87
Comparison: Both Arkansas law and the Code solve the major
problems of unlimited inheritance: the expense and difficulty of
locating more remote relatives, the possibility of frivolous litigation
contesting the will by "laughing heirs," '8 8 and the administrative
problems that could be caused by division of the estate into small
portions. The Code provision, by limiting inheritance to grandparents
and their descendants, covers fewer relatives than Arkansas. Perhaps
in today's society it is unlikely that family ties will be strong with
more remote relatives or with relatives of the spouse, except perhaps
the spouse's parents, brothers, and sisters. To the extent this is true,
the Code provision reflects the intent of the "average" testator. The
Code would provide for escheat to the state more frequently, but
in a society where the state is far more likely to provide care than
remote relatives, this may be more appropriate.
G. Representation by Descendants - Per Stirpes and Per Capita
at Each Generation
The concept of representation permits persons in a more remote
degree of kinship to an intestate to take the share of a predeceased
ancestor even though relatives of closer degree of kinship to the
intestate survive. Unfortunately, understanding the basic concept does
not adequately explain what share each relative will take. The most
common problem has been the determination of the generation which
is to be considered the root generation for purposes of setting the
stock shares of the more remote relatives who are able to represent
their ancestors. For example, under a common, but not uniform,
interpretation of the words "per stirpes," this root generation is
the generation closest in degree of relationship to the decedent, even
if none of those in the closest degree are able to take. Neither
Arkansas nor the Code uses this approach.
86. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-13-101 to -112 (Michie 1987).
87. U.P.C. § 2-105 (1990) (amended 1993).
88. See David F. Cavers, Change in the American Family and the "Laughing
Heir, " 20 IOWA L. REV. 203 (1935).
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In Arkansas, the estate is divided into shares at the first level
at which a taker survives. The heirs take "per capita" if they are
all related to the decedent in the same degree;89 if they are related
in unequal degrees, while those who are related in the closest degree
will take per capita, those in more remote degrees will take "per
stirpes." 9 The rationale for this approach is that it is more likely
that the intestate would want to treat relatives of the same degree
equally. The underlying policy for this approach is that most decedents,
if they thought about it, would desire to divide equally the estate
among living relatives of equal degree but to favor a living relative
of a closer degree. A limiting feature of this policy is that
representation is only employed when the descendants are of unequal
degree. Although this method will accomplish equality among equals
in many cases, it will not accomplish such equality in all situations.
Under the 1990 Code, the estate is divided, for representation
purposes, by a method called "per capita at each generation." 9'
Accordingly, the estate is divided into primary shares at the first
generation that contains one or more living members. 92 Representation
is recognized for living descendants of this generation plus the number
of deceased persons in this generation who themselves have living
descendants. 93 After the living members are allocated their shares,
the remaining unallocated shares are combined and divided among
the next generation that contains any living members in the same
way, and so on. 94
The foundation for using the per capita at each generation
system derives in part from the result of informal surveys which
reflect that when persons are given a clear example and asked how
they would want their estate distributed, the method selected
overwhelmingly is the per capita at each generation approach. 9
89. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-204(1) (Michie 1987).
90. Id. §§ 28-9-204(2), -205, -214. Although the statute uses the phrase "per
stirpes" to describe its representation technique, it might more properly be called
"per capita with per capita representation." AVERILL, supra note 5, at 48. This
technique was the system originally adopted by the Uniform Commissioners when
the Uniform Probate Code was issued in 1969. As indicated below, this technique
was dropped in 1990 in favor of a system called "per capita at each generation."
See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
91. U.P.C. § 2-106 (1990) (amended 1993).
92. Id. § 2-106(b).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Raymond H. Young, Meaning of "Issue" and "Descendants," 13 PROB.
NOTES 225-27 (1988). A questionnaire was distributed to Fellows of the American
College of Probate Counsel. (Now called the American College of Trust and Estate
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Generally, a person desires to divide his or her estate equally among
living relatives of equal degree but to favor a living relative of a
closer degree. 96 The importance of the matter is relevant only when
the descendants are of unequal degree. The notable feature of the
per capita at each generation method is that it never allows a person
of a more remote degree to inherit more than a person of closer
degree.
The following example contrasts an application of the above
rules. Presume D had three children, Cl, C2, and C3. Cl had three
children, GCI, GC2, and GC3; C2 had one child, GC4; and C3
had two children, GC5 and GC6.
If at D's death, C2 and C3 are alive, C1 is deceased, and all
grandchildren are alive, both systems will distribute among the
descendants in the same manner: the portion that the descendants
receive will be divided into three stocks with C2 and C3 each receiving
one-third, and the children of Cl represent their ancestor and divide
the one-third stock share equally. Accordingly, GC1, GC2, and GC3
will each receive one-third of one-third (one-ninth). None of the
grandchildren who are C2's and C3's children will share in the estate
because their respective ancestors, C2 and C3, survived and took
their own shares.
If at D's death, all of the children (Cl, C2, and C3) are dead,
both systems will again distribute among the descendants in the
same way: the distributable portion will be divided equally to each
grandchild. Because all takers are of the same degree of relationship
to the decedent, these systems ignore the stocks involved and distribute
the estate on a per capita basis.
If at D's death, C3 and all grandchildren survived, but C1 and
C2 predeceased D, the two systems will distribute the shares differently.
Under the Arkansas system, the distributable portion will be divided
into three stock shares. C3 receives a full one-third, and the children
of each deceased child (Cl and C2) represent their ancestor and
divide their ancestor's one-third stock share. GCl, GC2, and GC3
take one-third of one-third or one-ninth and GC4 takes a full one-
third. Under the Code's per capita at each generation method, the
distributable portion is also divided into thirds and C3 would receive
a full one-third. The remaining two stock shares, however, are
Counsel.) Id. at 225. The results were surprising to some; they overwhelmingly
preferred the per capita at each generation approach over both per stirpes and per
capita with representation. Id. Professor Averill has had similar results in many
years of polling students in decedents' estate classes.
96. See U.P.C. § 2-106 cmt. (1990) (amended 1993).
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combined together and the children of the deceased children, Cl
and C2, each share equally in the remaining two-thirds of the estate.
In other words, rather than retaining the stock shares and dividing
these shares depending on how many children each represented
ancestor had, all of the persons in the same generation always receive
an equal share. In our example, each grandchild representing an
ancestor receives one-fourth of two-thirds (one-sixth). If several of
these grandchildren are also unable to take and if they left surviving
descendants, the same procedure is followed again by combining all
of the shares for the deceased grandchildren into one share and
then by dividing it equally among all of the great-grandchildren who
represent their ancestors.
III. PROBLEMS OF STATUS
A. Necessity of Status Determination
Every inheritance statute describes its intestate succession bene-
ficiaries in terms of relational classifications such as "parent,"
"grandparent," "descendant," "heirs," and "surviving spouse.'' 97
For distribution calculation purposes, it is necessary to identify the
person or persons who qualify as members of these classifications.
This determination is a problem of status. Because of the importance
of this problem for intestate succession and other related purposes,
the codes usually contain several specific provisions concerning the
status of persons who fall into such categories as half-blooded
relatives, posthumous heirs, adopted persons, persons born out of
wedlock, and spouses.
B. Half-Blooded Relatives
Half-blooded relatives are a decedent's collateral relatives who
share one common ancestor with the decedent but not both common
ancestors. Both Arkansas law and the Codc provide similarly for
half-blooded relatives. 98 Descendants of ancestors covered by the
intestacy provisions who are half-blooded relatives inherit the same
as they would if they were whole-blooded relatives.9
C. Afterborn (Posthumous) Persons
Under Arkansas law, descendants of a decedent who were
conceived before the decedent's death but born after it, inherit the
97. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-214 (Michie 1987) is typical of these statutes.
98. Id. § 28-9-213; U.P.C. § 2-107 (1990) (amended 1993).
99. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-213 (Michie 1987); U.P.C. § 2-107 (1990) (amended
1993).
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same as if they had been born during the decedent's lifetime.1°° Only
descendant's posthumous heirs are covered.
Under the Code, individuals who were conceived before the
decedent's death but born after it, inherit the same as if they had
been born during the decedent's lifetime.' 0' These persons must live
120 hours or more after their birth in order to qualify.'02 The relatives
who might be able to fall within this category would be either the
decedent's descendants, parents' descendants, or grandparents'
descendants. 103
The situations in which this distinction is critical are few, since
if the parents of the unborn child are alive, the one related to the
intestate will be the heir. However, it could make a difference in
a limited number of cases. For example, suppose the intestate were
survived by a niece, the daughter of a deceased sister, and that at
the time of his death, the surviving spouse of the decedent's brother
was pregnant. Under current Arkansas law, the niece would inherit
to the exclusion of the unborn child of the intestate's brother who
would be of the same degree of relationship to the intestate. Under
the Code, the niece and the unborn child would share equally.
There appears to be no reason to exclude such an unborn child.
Because distribution of the estate will almost surely take longer than
gestation, there is no administrative problem in his or her inclusion.
Arkansas law already extends inheritance to a posthumous descendant
and there seems to be no rationale for treating posthumous collateral
relatives differently from posthumous descendants. Adoption of the
Code provision would place Arkansas in line with the majority of
American jurisdictions.
D. Adopted Persons
In Arkansas, a final decree of adoption terminates all legal
relationships between the adopted child and that child's natural
parents "for all purposes including inheritance."'04 This creates a
parent-child relationship between the adopted child and the adoptive
parents "as if the adopted individual were a legitimate blood
descendant of the petitioner [adopting parent], for all purposes
including inheritance."105
100. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-210 (Michie 1987).
101. U.P.C. § 2-108 (1990) (amended 1993).
102. Id.
103. As governed by U.P.C. § 2-103 (1990) (amended 1993).
104. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-215(a) (Michie 1993).
105. Id. § 9-9-215(a)(2).
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The Code is more comprehensive and recognizes that there are
two primary types of adoption circumstances, i.e., the "new family
adoption," and the "family realignment adoption."'16
(1) New Family Adoption: The "new family adoption"
concerns the situation where a natural parent or both natural parents
voluntarily put their child up for adoption and an entirely new
family, usually a husband and wife, adopt the child. 0 7 In this
situation, the Code severs the relationship of the adopted child from
that child's natural parents and grafts a new relationship between
the adopted child and the adopting parents for inheritance purposes. 08
Under this analysis, the adopted person inherits by, from, and
through that person's adopting parents and vice-versa. However, no
by, from, or through inheritance rights continue between the adopted
child and the natural parents or vice-versa."09
(2) Family Realignment Adoption: The "family realignment
adoption" concerns the situation where one of the natural parents
continues as a normal custodial parent of the child, a new adopting
parent or non-natural parent adopts the child, and the other natural
parent continues in a noncustodial relationship." 0 In this situation,
the Code does not automatically sever inheritance possibilities between
the child and either of the child's natural parents. The child is
permitted to inherit by, from, and through both natural parents and
the adopting parent."' The adopting parent inherits by, from, and
through the child. The custodial natural parent may inherit by, from,
and through the child if that natural parent has openly treated the
child as that person's child and has not refused to support the child
during the child's years when support is legally mandated." 12






112. The comment to section 2-114 states: "The adopted individual and the
adopted individual's descendants continue to have a right of inheritance from and
through that noncustodial natural parent, but that noncustodial natural parent and
that noncustodial natural parent's family do not have a right to inherit from or
through the adopted individual." Id. § 2-114 cmt. Perplexingly, section 2-114(c)
implies that either natural parent could inherit if he or she "openly treated the
child as his [or hers], and has not refused to support the child." Do these statements
conflict? From a practical standpoint they probably do not. It is unlikely that the
noncustodial natural parent would satisfy this requirement but what if one did?
Could that noncustodial natural parent and his or her relatives inherit from the
adopted child? For example, consider the natural parent who has three children
which he or she supported until death. At death the decedent left a surviving
[Vol. 17:631
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The primary difference between the adoption provisions in
Arkansas and the Code concerns the status of the natural parents
when one of the natural parents continues as a normal custodial
parent of the child, a new adopting parent or non-natural parent
adopts this child, and the other natural parent continues in a
noncustodial relationship. Under Arkansas law, the adopted child
would not inherit from or through the noncustodial parent, but
would inherit under the Code. The Code grants greater inheritance
protection to the adopted child. A natural parent of the adopted
child can inherit from this child only if the parent openly treated
the child as his or her child and willingly supported the child." 3
Considered through the viewpoint of the adopted child, these
provisions seem reasonable and preferable.
E. Nonmarital Issue
Under Arkansas law, the nonmarital ("illegitimate") child is
able to inherit from and through the child's mother, and may inherit
from and through his or her father if there is (1) an adjudication
of paternity, (2) a written acknowledgment by the father or his
written consent to entry of his name on the child's birth certificate,
(3) intermarriage by the parents prior to the child's birth or an
attempt to marry but the marriage "is or could be declared invalid,"
or (4) an obligation of the father to support the child by written
promise or court order." 4 A 1979 amendment to the statute left
intact the earlier provision legitimizing the children of void marriages
and children whose parents later marry and who are recognized by
the father." 5
The Code provides that the marital status of parents, as far as
their children are concerned, is irrelevant for inheritance purposes." 6
Consequently, within the meaning of the intestacy laws for purposes
of determining succession, a nonmarital child inherits by, through,
and from natural parents so long as the parent and child relationship
can be established. Inheritance from or through the child by a
spouse, two adult children by a previous relationship, and one minor child from
the current relationship. The latter's surviving natural parent remarries and the
new spouse adopts the minor child but not the adult children. If the adopted
parents predecease the adopted child, do the adopted child's non adopted half-
blooded siblings have intestacy inheritance rights from the adopted child? Possibly
they should and section 2-114(c) may allow them to do so.
113. U.P.C. § 2-114(c) (1990) (amended 1993).
114. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-209 (Michie 1987).
115. 1979 ARK. ACTS 1015, §§ 1-3.
116. U.P.C. § 2-109(2) (1990) (amended 1993).
UALR LAW JOURNAL
natural parent or his or her kindred, however, occurs only if that
parent openly treated the child as his or her child and did not refuse
to support the child while the parent had a legal obligation to
provide support .17
The Code eschews the existence of a marriage when a child is
born and relates inheritance to maternity and paternity instead.
Because it does not define what a parent-child relationship is, other
states' laws concerned with parentage must be referred to."8 Some
of the Arkansas provisions, such as legitimation by written
acknowledgment or by the father's consent to entry of his name on
the birth certificate, which are designed to allow inheritance without
a court proceeding for legitimation, might be retained unless the
Uniform Parentage Act is enacted in Arkansas."19
F. Aliens or Noncitizens
Under both Arkansas law and the Code, persons who are aliens
or noncitizens are not disqualified from inheriting or transmitting
by inheritance merely because of their alienage. 2 0
G. Survivorship
In order to inherit in intestacy, an heir must survive the intestate.12'
The general common law rule holds, however, that survival need
not be for any specific length of time: any measurable length of
time such as one minute or theoretically one second is sufficient.122
When the question of one's survival materially affects the distribution
of the intestate's estate, the timing of death becomes an extremely
disrupting and litigable issue. 23
In Arkansas, disputes over survivorship are determined under
the original Uniform Simultaneous Death Act.' 24 Section 1 of this
Act provides that in an intestacy situation when "there is no sufficient
evidence that the persons have died otherwise than simultaneously,
the property of each person shall be disposed of as if he had
117. Id. § 2-114(c).
118. Id. The Code recommends enactment of the Uniform Parentage Act but
will function under any set of provisions concerning paternity. For the Arkansas
approach, see ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-10-101 to -119 (Michie 1993).
119. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-209(d) (Michie 1987).
120. Id. § 28-9-211; U.P.C. § 2-111 (1990) (amended 1993).
121. "Heir" is defined at ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-203(b) (Michie 1987) and
U.P.C. § 1-201(21).
122. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-203(c) is typical. It provides that an interest in
property passes "immediately" upon the death of the intestate.
123. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
124. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-10-101 (Michie 1987).
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survived."" 5 Unfortunately, this solution is only a partial one. It
clearly implies that if there is adequate proof of the actual sequence
of death in measurable time, the presumption does not apply and
the "surviving" heir, no matter for how short a period of time,
will be entitled to inherit that heir's intestate share from the intestate's
estate. This issue alone has caused litigation over who survived, and
unnecessary expense by requiring multiple administrations of the
same property. 12 6
Under the Code, in order to qualify as an heir, a person must
survive the decedent for 120 hours.' Furthermore, the burden of
proving the heir's survivorship for the stated length of time is put
on the person who seeks to claim through the heir. Failure of such
proof is conclusively presumed to show failure to survive. The only
exception to this rule is that the survival time requirement does not
apply if the decedent's property would escheat to the state because
of a death of the only heir or heirs during this time period. 2 8 In
this situation, the common law's mere survivorship rule applies. In
addition, the Code adopts as a default rule of construction the same
durational survivorship technique for all types of gratuitous transfers
including wills and all other governing instruments. 2 9 Whereas the
survivorship requirement is conclusive in intestacy, when wills or
other dispository instruments are involved, the requirement may be
controlled by the instrument. 30
Although questions of the time of death might still present a
problem, the 120-hour rule will substantially reduce litigation over
who has survived and avoid multiple administration of the same
property where it is totally unnecessary.
H. Advancements
At common law, an heir's intestate share would be affected if
the heir received an advancement from the intestate during the latter's
lifetime. By common law definition, an advancement meant an
irrevocable inter vivos gift of money or property, real or personal,
to a child by a parent that enables the child to anticipate the child's
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., Janus v. Tarasewicz, 482 N.E.2d 418 (I11. App. Ct. 1985); In re
Bucci, 57 Misc. 2d 1001 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1968); Schmitt v. Pierce, 344 S.W.2d 120
(Mo. 1961).
127. U.P.C. § 2-104 (1990) (amended 1993).
128. Id.
129. Id. § 2-702.
130. Id. § 2-702(d).
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inheritance from the parent, to the extent of the gift. 3 ' The principal
question raised when there has been an inter vivos gift by a donor
to a prospective heir is whether the gift is intended as an advancement.
Because the intent of the donor at the time of the gift is the
determinative factor, not all such gifts are so characterized. Seldom,
however, does one find that a donor has clearly indicated that intent.
The transferring document, if there even is one, will seldom specifically
indicate one way or the other. The result has been that the question
of what constitutes proof of this intent has caused a substantial
amount of litigation. 132
Under the Code, a gift is an advancement only if any one of
several formalities is satisfied.'33 A gift is a formal advancement if
either the donor "declared in a contemporaneous writing" or the
heir "acknowledged in writing" that the gift is an advancement.' 34
The required writing may, rather than declaring the gift is an
advancement, merely indicate that the gift must be taken into account
in computing the division or distribution of decedent's intestate
estate.' No words of art such as "advancement" must be used by
the donor. There is also no specific requirement that the written
declaration of intent to make a formal advancement has to be
communicated to the donee at the time of the gift. 3 6
Arkansas's provision is virtually identical to the original Code. 3 7
It does not, however, require that a writing by the decedent indicating
a gift or an advancement be "contemporaneous."' 38 It also does
not contain the language that allows an advancement to a recipient
who predeceases the intestate to be used in calculating the shares
of the recipient's descendants if the writing or acknowledgment so
provides. 139
The formality requirements coincide with modern estate planning
practice and theory, because most gifts today are not thought of
131. ATKINSON, supra note 33, § 129.
132. See Mary L. Fellows, Concealing Legislative Reform in the Common-Law
Tradition: The Advancements Doctrine and the Uniform Probate Code, 37 Vand.
L. Rev. 671 (1984).
133. U.P.C. § 2-109 (1990) (amended 1993).
134. Id. § 2-109(a)(i).
135. Id. § 2-109(a)(ii).
136. The advancement may even take some form other than an outright gift.
See id. § 2-109.
137. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-216 (Michie 1987).
138. The statute deletes the phrase "in a contemporaneous writing" that is found
at U.P.C. § 2-109(a)(i) (1990) (amended 1993).
139. Compare U.P.C. § 2-109(c) (1990) (amended 1993) with ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 28-9-216(c) (Michie 1987).
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as transfers in anticipation of an inheritance. The rules alleviate the
evidentiary problem of proving intent by requiring that the intent
be in writing. Frequent litigation attempting to discover a decedent's
intent is precluded by the requirement of a writing. The writing
could be a contemporaneous written note or an indication that the
gift is a formal advancement, which is included with the donor's
personal records. Of course, the writing must be available or provable
after the donor's death when distribution decisions are made.
I. Debtor Heirs
How should intestacy law treat an heir who is indebted to the
decedent at the time of death? Arkansas's provision is virtually
identical to the Code with only insignificant differences in wording.'40
Under both provisions, the debt owed to the estate by a debtor-
heir is to be charged against the heir's intestate share. 41 The debt
is not to be charged against the share of the debtor-heir's descendants
if the debtor-heir fails to survive the decedent.14 2
IV. TESTAMENTARY EXECUTION
A. General Considerations on Wills
A fundamental device for distributing wealth upon death is the
will. Presently, a will is a creature of statute. 43 To constitute a valid
will, these statutory provisions customarily require that a will must:
(1) be voluntarily executed; (2) be executed by a competent person;
(3) appear in a written or other specifically approved form; (4) be
intended to take effect only after the testator's death; and (5) dispose
of property, or make other directions, or both.' " Wills are also
characteristically ambulatory and revocable. 45 They are ambulatory
in the sense that they apply to the situation that exists at the testator's
death rather than that which was present at the time of the exe-
140. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-217 (Michie 1987); U.P.C. § 2-110 (1990) (amended
1993).
141. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-217 (Michie 1987); U.P.C. § 2-110 (1990) (amended
1993).
142. See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-217 (Michie 1987); U.P.C. § 2-110 (1990)
(amended 1993).
143. ALISON REPPY & LESLIE J. TOMPKINS, HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY BACK-
GROUND OF THE LAW OF WILLS 48 (1928).
144. See 1 WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF
WILLS § 1.2 (3d ed. 1960).
145. ATKINSON, supra note 33, § 1, at 2.
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cution.146 Wills are also revocable by a competent testator who follows
the proper revocation procedure. Although all jurisdictions by statute
provide methods for making and revoking wills, execution require-
ments unfortunately vary greatly between them. 147 This lack.of uni-
formity results in a serious lack of predictability for persons whose
estates cross state lines or who change domiciles during their lives.
All will statutes require certain formalities for execution of
attested wills. Several purposes have been identified for these for-
malities including purposes to protect and safeguard the testator, to
provide reliable proof and evidence, to provide an event that em-
phasizes the finality of intent and of the act of execution, to result
in a document that will receive the anticipated legal response and
recognition, and to provide administrative judicial efficiency. 148 These
purposes present a good case for requiring certain formalities to
take place before one should be said to have satisfied the require-
ments. Considering the solemnness, importance, and finality of a
will, it has been common for states to set out elaborate formalities
necessary to be followed in order to satisfy and to produce a
recognizable and valid will.
Generally, a will is an intent-enforcing type of document. The
goal of the instrument is to identify and explain the desires of the
testator. It is assumed that if these desires and intent are adequately
expressed, they will be obeyed. The difficulty is that they have no
effect and are a nullity unless the instrument can be proven and
thereby probated. To probate a will successfully, one must satisfy
the execution formalities set out in the statute that recognizes a will
as a transfer device. The dilemma created by legal formalities is
that if a formality is not obeyed and it is considered a crucial
formality, the failure to satisfy the formality may cause the instru-
ment to fail and thus cause an intent-denying rather than intent-
enforcing result. 49 Consequently, formalities ought to be designed
to provide safeguards, but not to strike down documents obviously
intended to have legal effect. Finding that middle ground is the
goal. Through a series of provisions, the Code finds that dividing
line. 10 Unfortunately, Arkansas's present statutes on execution of
146. ATKINSON, supra note 33, § 1, at 2.
147. See AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRUSTS & ESTATES COUNSEL, STUDY # 1, WILLS
REQUIREMENTS OF VARIOUS STATES (1995).
148. Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous
Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1 (1941); John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with
the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1975).
149. See, e.g., In re Pavlinko's Estate, 148 A.2d 528 (Pa. 1959).
150. See U.P.C. §§ 2-502 to -513 (1990) (amended 1993).
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attested wills impose maximum formalities and thus may have intent-
defeating consequences. 5'
The Code's will provisions have three primary objectives: (1)
to make the execution requirements for wills uniform among the
jurisdictions; (2) to reduce execution requirements to their indis-
pensable minimum; and (3) to validate as often as possible instru-
ments purporting to be wills. For basic validity, the Code recognizes
four separate and alternative will execution techniques, the successful
satisfaction of any one of which produces a probatable will in a
Code state. For convenience, the four techniques result in four types
of wills called the ordinary witnessed will, 52 the holographic or
handwritten will,' the foreign will, 5 4 and the international will.'
The Code also includes a special procedure for executing a fifth
kind of will called the self-proved will, which, although not essential
for basic validity, is useful to follow for purposes of easing proof
of execution requirements in contested wilJ cases. 56
Both Arkansas law and the Code provide for attested wills and
holographic wills; neither permits an oral or nuncupative will. Both
have identical sections setting the minimum age for making a will
at eighteen. There the similarity ceases.
151. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-103 (Michie 1987).
152. U.P.C. § 2-502(a) (1990) (amended 1993).
153. Id. § 2-502(b).
154. Id. § 2-506.
155. U.P.C., art. 1, pt. 10 (1990) (amended 1993).
156. Id. § 2-504.
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B. The Ordinary Witnessed Will
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-101 (Michie 1987).
U.P.C. § 2-501 (1990) (amended 1993).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-101 (Michie 1987).
U.P.C. § 2-501 (1990) (amended 1993).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-103 (Michie 1987).
U.P.C. § 2-502(a)(1) (1990) (amended 1993).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-103 (Michie 1987).
U.P.C. § 2-502(a)(2) (1990) (amended 1993).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-103 (Michie 1987).
Id.
U.P.C. § 2-502(a)(3) (1990) (amended 1993).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-102 (Michie 1987).
U.P.C. § 2-505(a) (1990) (amended 1993).
The Ordinary Witnessed Will
Under Arkansas Law Under U.P.C.
Testator - age of eighteen'5 7  "Any person 18 or more years of
age''158
Testator - "of sound mind" at "of sound mind"'16
time of execution' 59
A will or instrument 6 ' "in writing' ' 62
Signed by testator - the intended "signed by testator or in testator's
signature or proxy in his presence name by some other individual in
and by his direction - the proxy the testator's conscious presence and
must write own name and state he by the testator's direction"' 16
or she signed at testator's request 163
Signed (signature) "at the end" of [No similar requirement - may be
the will' 65  signed anywhere on will]
Witnesses - "two or more attesting "two individuals"'' 67
witnesses"166
Witnesses - "competent to be "An individual generally
witness generally" 168 competent' '169
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Witnesses - disinterested - no [No disinterested requirement].
direct "beneficial interest by way "The signing of a will by an
of devise '1 17  interested witness does not
invalidate the will or any provision
of it.''",
Interest taken away - witness [Not applicable]
"forfeits" amount above what
witness would have received had
testator died intestate 72
Testator must declare to witnesses [No similar requirement]
that instrument is his will
73
Witnesses - attestation - Witnesses - attestation -
authentication: authentication:
Witness either the testator signing, "witnessed either the signing of the
or the testator's acknowledgment will . . . or the testator's
of the signature 74  acknowledgment of the signature or
of the will''
75
Witnesses - must be requested [No "request" required]
to: 76
- Sign "signed by'' 177
- sign in testator's [Not applicable]
presence:
(at end?) [Not applicable]
Comparison: The Code reduces the formalities to a minimum
without sacrificing the desired protections of formalities.
C. Holographic Wills
A holographic will is a will that is in the handwriting of the
testator but which usually lacks other will formalities such as the
witnessing requirement. 78 Approximately one-half the states have
provisions authorizing holographic wills as an alternative testamentary
device. "79 Such recognition is consistent with modern will policies,
170. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-102 (Michie 1987).
171. U.P.C. § 2-505(b) (1990) (amended 1993).
172. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-102 (Michie 1987).
173. Id. § 28-25-103.
174. Id.
175. U.P.C. § 2-502(a)(3) (1990) (amended 1993).
176. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-103 (Michie 1987).
177. U.P.C. § 2-502(a)(3) (1990) (amended 1993).
178. ATKINSON, supra note 33, § 75, at 355.
179. See AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRUSTS & ESTATES COUNSEL, supra note 147.
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which generally increase recognition and reduce denials of probate.
In addition, many of the old fears with regard to fraud and undue
influence have either not materialized or are not relevant today
because the holographic procedure satisfactorily protects a person
from these dangers.
Although they differ, both Arkansas law and the Code recognize
holographic wills. Neither statute requires that the holograph be
dated, or that the signature be at the end.'80 The following chart
outlines the basic respective requirements:
Holographic Wills
Under Arkansas Law'8' Under U.P.C.8 2
Testator's "signature" and Testator's "signature" and
"the entire body of the will" ''material portions of the
document"
"shall be written in the proper must be "in the testator's
handwriting of the testator." handwriting."
Both Arkansas law and the Code provide requirements for the
proof of holographic wills. Arkansas law requires that the hand-
writing and signature be established by the testimony of three wit-
nesses.8 3 This is too burdensome in many cases. If all the heirs
agree that the holograph is valid, it seems superfluous to require
more than one witness. Section 3-303 of the Code permits the will
to be probated informally on the basis of a sworn statement or
affidavit of one witness; in a formal testacy proceeding the amount
of proof depends on whether the probate is contested. 8 4 Thus, if
180. Where the testator's name appears in the body of a holograph but not at
the end, there is an issue as to whether the testator intended this as his signature.
Compare Nelson v. Texarkana Historical Soc'y & Museum, 257 Ark. 394, 516
S.W.2d 882 (1974) (name was not intended to be a signature) with Smith v.
MacDonald, 252 Ark. 931, 481 S.W.2d 741 (1972) (name in body of the will
constituted a signature). The Arkansas court is liberal in admitting evidence of
testator's declarations and the surrounding circumstances on this issue.
181. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-104 (Michie 1987).
182. U.P.C. § 2-502(b) (1990) (amended 1993).
183. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-104 (Michie 1987).
184. U.P.C. § 3-303 (1990) (amended 1993).
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there is no contest, under section 3-405, the court may allow probate
on the basis of the sworn petition alone.185 If there is doubt about
the handwriting, a contest is likely, and expert testimony will probably
be obtained anyway.
Comparison: Significantly, the Code neither requires that a
holographic will be dated nor prescribes the location of the testator's
signature. The Code's "material portions" terminology must be
compared to the "entire body" terminology found in the Arkansas
statute. The Code's terminology is specifically intended to counteract
strict statutory constructions applied by some courts to the words
"entirely written.' ' 86 These courts have held holographic wills invalid
if they contain any printed matter on their faces provided that the
testators intended the printed matter to be a part of the wills. 87 By
contrast, the "material portions" terminology should permit a hold-
ing of validity for a holographic will executed on a printed will
form if the printed portions can be eliminated and if the handwritten
portions still adequately describe the testator's testamentary scheme. 88
In addition, if the material portions of a will are in the testator's
handwriting, the Code specifically allows printed portions of the
will to be used to show testamentary intent. 8 9
D. Dispensing Power and the Substantial Compliance Doctrine
Because the validity or invalidity of an instrument such as a
will is so important to the distribution of an estate, the determination
of validity has been a highly litigated issue. Opponents of wills are
likely to offer any reason to deny probate. Consequently, the
formalities of the execution statute have been a fertile breeding
ground for these arguments. Courts that face this litigation are put
in a policy bind. On the one hand, the court is conscious and
respectful of legislative intent as expressed in the appropriate wills
statute. If the legislature has set out a particular formality to follow,
185. Id. § 3-405.
186. Id. § 2-502 cmt.; see ATKINSON, supra note 33, § 75. In addition, in 1990
the Code changed the original phrase from "material provisions" to "material
portions" in order to prevent restrictive interpretations of this approach.
187. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Requirement that Holographic Will, or its
Material Provisions, be Entirely in Testator's Handwriting as Affected by Appearance
of Some Printed or Written Matter Not in Testator's Handwriting, 37 A.L.R.4th
528 (1985).
188. U.P.C. § 2-502(b) cmt. (1990) (amended 1993). But see, e.g., In re Johnson,
630 P.2d 1044 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (after excusing printed material, handwritten
remainder failed to express testamentary intent).
189. U.P.C. § 2-502(c) (1990) (amended 1993).
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it is not for the court to ignore. On the other hand, the invalidation
of a will because of a failure on the part of the testator to conform
to a technical formality may appear extremely picayune and callous
when the result is contrary to the clearly expressed and finalized
intent of the testator.
Generally, courts have followed the concept of strict construction,
i.e., an instrument must satisfy all the formalities set out in the
statute.' 9 Consequently, when analyzing the validity of the instrument,
one has to dissect the statute word by word to see what the formalities
are and whether they have been satisfied. To ensure that the policy
of strict construction is kept within its legitimate domain, courts
have adopted the doctrine that formalities, other than those required
by the statute, will not be added. Generally, one must only satisfy
the formalities required and no more.' 9' In addition, courts do not
object to greater formalization than the statute requires.
Even where strict construction is the court's philosophy, some
have been willing to ignore or to interpret generously some incidental
formalities in the statutes. 192 For example, a statute might require
the testator to "request" the witnesses to witness the will. The word
"request" may be liberally interpreted to mean the circumstances
must indicate that the testator wanted the witnesses to witness the
will. The testator need not have actually verbally requested the
witnesses to do so. 193 This might be referred to as a reasonable
compliance standard for these incidental formalities. Arkansas has
followed this approach. 94
It is difficult, however, to distinguish between a formality that
is going to receive a strict construction versus one that will receive
a reasonable construction. In addition, experience informs us that
190. See 2 PAGE, supra note 144, § 19.4. "Whether the courts profess to follow
the harsher rule, or whether they profess to follow the milder rule, they generally
agree on the result which they reach. The testator must perform each of the acts
which is required by the statute in order to execute a valid will; and the courts
rarely require more." 2 PAGE, supra note 144, at 68.
191. See, e.g., Lemayne v. Stanley, 3 Lev. 1 (1691) but cf. Estate of McKellar's,
380 So. 2d 1273 (Miss. 1980).
192. See, e.g., In re Demaris Estate, 110 P.2d 571 (Or. 1944), where the court
adopted the "conscious presence" test to satisfy the requirement that the witnesses
must sign in the testator's presence. The "conscious presence" test has now been
adopted by the Code. U.P.C. § 2-502 (1990) (amended 1993).
193. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Hollingsworth, 240 Ark. 582, 401 S.W.2d 555
(1966).
194. See Id.; Hanel v. Springle, 237 Ark. 356, 372 S.W.2d 822 (1963); Tatum
v. Chandler, 229 Ark. 864, 319 S.W.2d 513 (1958); Orr v. Love, 225 Ark. 505,
283 S.W.2d 667 (1955).
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it is unlikely that courts will, on their own, adopt a more reasonable
approach with regard to most formalities set out in will statutes. 95
Consequently, a statutory substantial compliance approach or
dispensing power is essential. 196
The Code contains a dispensing power provision.1 97 Its provision
permits a court to dispense with one or more statutory formalities
even if they have not been followed, so long as the proponents of
the document or writing establish by clear and convincing evidence
that the testator intended the document to constitute the decedent's
will or other will-related instructions. 19 The provision is unspecific
as to which formalities may be dispensed. With the exception that
195. John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 489 (1975). Cf. In re Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339 (N.J. 1991) (allowing relief,
although the court applied a literal interpretation to its wills act requirements under
a separate court-developed substantial compliance doctrine that permits formal
probate of a document despite execution deficiencies if clear and convincing evidence
shows substantial compliance with the statutory requirements).
196. The proper place and scope of formalities in executing wills has become a
cause celebre in recent legal literature. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 195, at 489
(proposing a substantial compliance doctrine for wills); James Lindgren, Abolishing
the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L. REV. 541 (1990) (abolishing the
attestation by witnesses requirement); James Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55
ALB. L. REV. 1009 (1992) (contending that proof of testamentary intent is the key,
not procedural techniques or physical attributes); Lydia A. Clougherty, Comment,
An Analysis of the National Advisory Committee on Uniform State Laws' Rec-
ommendation to Modify the Wills Act Formalities, 10 PROB. L.J. 283 (1991)
(opposing the "substantial compliance" doctrine). Cf. Gerry W. Beyer, The Will
Execution Ceremony-History, Significance, and Strategies, 29 S. TEX. L.J. 413
(1987) (detailing the critical importance of the will execution ceremony and setting
forth proper will execution technique). There is legitimate concern that when wills
execution statutes mandate only "bare-bones" requirements, the legitimacy of some
of the retained requirements is subject to question. For example, if the testator
does not have to sign in the presence of witnesses, and the witnesses do not have
to sign in the presence of the testator, then the continued attestation of witnesses
is hardly justifiable. Cf. JOHN RITCHIE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS'
ESTATES AND TRUSTS 277 n. 18 (8th ed. 1993). What might make the witnessing
requirement worthy of retention is the ritual function of formalities and its psy-
chological benefits. See Beyer, supra. The effort to eliminate rejection of wills
because of technical formality errors has reached England and New Zealand. See
R.T. Oerton, Dispensing With the Formalities, 141 NEW L.J. 1416 (1991); Rosemary
Tobin, The Wills Act Formalities: A Need for Reform, 1991 NEw ZEALAND L.J.
191. The issue has also been rekindled in Queensland, Australia, one of the first
jurisdictions to enact the "substantial compliance" concept to wills validation. See
John K. de Groot, Will Execution Formalities- What Constitutes Substantial Com-
pliance?, 20 QUEENSLAND L. Soc'Y J. 93 (1990).
197. U.P.C. § 2-503 (1990) (amended 1993). The Editorial Board of the Uniform
Probate Code states that one of the themes to probate law sounded in the last
twenty years is "the decline of formalism in favor of intent-serving policies."
U.P.C., art. 11, prefatory note (1994).
198. U.P.C. § 2-503 (1990) (amended 1993).
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there must be a document or a writing added upon a document,
all other formalities are subject to the dispensing remedy. Arkansas
has no comparable provisions.
Comparison: The Code provides a remedy where current Arkansas
law is silent. An example of this would be a will that requires two
witnesses, but the testator only obtained one witness. 199 If the standard
of proof could be met, a court could dispense with the second
witness and permit the will to be probated. This provision does not
encourage testators to disregard the letter of the execution statutes;
it merely provides a remedy in those cases where a rejection of the
will causes significant intent-denying results to occur despite the
available proof of that intent. The purpose of the provision is to
convert ineffective attempts at finalized intent into effective, finalized
plans if the standard of evidence can be satisfied; it is not designed
to convert incomplete plans into finalized plans.2 00
E. Self-Proved Will
Arkansas allows use of an affidavit by the attesting witness in
lieu of direct testimony, but only in an uncontested probate. 20 1 The
Code includes a separate and more formalistic technique for executing
wills called the "self-proved will. '20 2 It is similar to the procedure
for an ordinary witnessed will but includes a notarized affidavit
executed by the testator and the witnesses. 203 It also adds to the
ordinary witnessed will execution process the following three execution
formalities: (1) the testator must declare to the witnesses that the
will is the testator's last will; (2) the witnesses must sign as witness
to the will; and (3) the witnesses must sign in the testator's presence
and hearing. 20
4
199. In exploring situations in which the dispensing power might be exercised,
consider the fact situation in Smith v. Nelson, 227 Ark. 512, 299 S.W.2d 645
(1957). Decedent died with a typewritten will signed by only one witness, and two
handwritten and signed letters referring to the will and its content. The court denied
the will probate because it failed to satisfy execution statutes and denied the letters
probate because they lacked testamentary intent. Considering the proof of the clear
and undisputed intent of the decedent, the facts of this case exhibit an excellent
opportunity to apply the Code's dispensing power.
200. AVERILL, supra note 5, at 131. Considering the uniqueness of wills validity
situations, the dispensing power will be exercised on a case by case basis. Decisions
on this issue will generally be too factually restrictive and therefore not provide
precedent for later cases.
201. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-106(d) (Michie 1987).
202. U.P.C. § 2-504 (1990) (amended 1993).
203. Id. § 2-504(b).
204. Id. § 2-504(a).
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Forms for two alternative affidavits are included in the Code.
The first affidavit form permits the self-proved will affidavit to be
a part of the will itself and actually constitutes the execution thereof.2 5
In using this form, the testator and the witnesses execute the affidavit
and the will simultaneously. 206 The second affidavit form is to be
executed separately from and subsequently to the execution of the
ordinary witnessed will. 20 7 When using this form, the testator and
the witnesses execute the will separately and then subsequently, in
a continuous or separate proceeding, complete and sign the affidavit.
The effect of executing a self-proved will is not very significant.
In most respects, when a self-proved will is offered for probate it
is subject to the same treatment as any other validly executed will.
Its principal distinguishing feature is to permit the will to be admitted
to probate in a formal testacy proceeding without the necessity of
testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses2 8 and the signature
requirement is conclusively presumed. 209 The will, however, still is
subject to contest on grounds such as revocation, undue influence,
lack of testamentary capacity, fraud, and even forgery.
210
Notwithstanding its limited significance, use of one or the other of
these forms should become standard practice for attorneys who draft
and supervise the execution of wills.
21
'
Comparison: The self-proved will under the Code is a much
broader concept with certain procedural advantages. The advantage
of executing a self-proved will is that it permits the will to be
admitted to probate in a formal testacy proceeding without the
testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses, 2 2 as the signature
requirement is conclusively presumed. 213 The will, however, still is
subject to contest on grounds such as revocation, undue influence,
lack of testamentary capacity, fraud, and even forgery. 21 4 The use
of one or the other of these forms should become standard practice
for attorneys who draft and supervise the execution of wills.
205. Id.
206. Id. § 2-504 cmt.
207. Id. § 2-504(b).
208. Id. § 3-406(a).
209. Id. § 3-406(b).
210. Id. § 3-406 cmt.; see AVERILL, supra note 5, § 18.02(F).
211. U.P.C. § 3-406 cmt. (1990) (amended 1993).
212. Id. § 3-406(a).
213. Id. § 3-406(b).
214. Id. § 3-406 cmt.
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F. Choice of Law as to Execution
Under Arkansas law, a written will executed outside Arkansas
is valid and probatable if it meets the requirements of either Arkansas
law, the law of the place of its execution, or the law of the testator's
domicile at the time of its execution. 21 5 This Arkansas provision does
not appear to recognize a will executed in Arkansas according to
the law of the testator's domicile but not valid under the law of
Arkansas. There is no logic to this rule because Arkansas would
recognize the will as valid if executed in any other state.
In addition to recognizing the validity of any foreign instrument
that happens to be executed according to Code prerequisites, the
Code also validates a will executed in compliance with the law of
any of the following jurisdictions: (1) the place of execution; (2)
the testator's domicile at the time of execution; (3) the testator's
place of abode at the time of execution; (4) the place of the testator's
nationality at the time of execution; (5) the testator's domicile at
the time of death; (6) the testator's place of abode at the time of
death; or (7) the testator's nationality at the time of death.2 1 6 If an
instrument is a valid will under the laws of any of these jurisdictions,
then the will is valid and may be probated in a Code state.21 7
In effect, if a relevant contact is satisfied, the Code literally
incorporates by reference the execution statute of the relevant
jurisdictions. Consequently, the execution procedures of these other
jurisdictions represent additional methods of executing a proper will
so long as one of the contact points is satisfied. The reference to
the laws of these other jurisdictions includes all aspects of the actual
execution process. The only expressed limitation imposed by the
provision on this reference to the execution laws of other jurisdictions
is that the will must be "written"; 218 consequently, nuncupative wills
are not recognized by the Code state even if recognized by the law
of the jurisdiction having a relevant contact.
Comparison: The Code approach is preferred to current Arkansas
law because it is broader and will validate more foreign wills.
G. Uniform International Wills Act219
The distinction between the International Wills Act and the
choice of law provision is significant. Whereas the choice of law
215. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-105 (Michie 1987).
216. U.P.C. § 2-506 (1990) (amended 1993).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. U.P.C., art. II, pt. 10 (1990) (amended 1993).
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rule attempts to validate wills executed under the laws of other
jurisdictions, the Act anticipates an execution intended to be valid
in jurisdictions that recognize it. By following the Act, the testator
selects a procedure that anticipates probate in different jurisdictions.
The expectation that this execution process will be valid for probate
of the will wherever necessary is greater than the expectation of the
testator who, at death, happens to have an estate requiring probate
in several jurisdictions. Enactment of the International Wills Act is
crucial to the protection of these expectations.
Arkansas has no special provision for an international will. The
Code includes the International Wills Act. 220 Under the Act, the
basic requirements of an international will are as follows:
(1) The will must be in writing.2 2 1 This writing requirement
covers any form of expression made by recognizable signs on a
durable substance. Any language can be used.
(2) The testator must declare that the document is the testator's
will and that testator knows its contents in the presence of three
people: two witnesses and another "authorized person. 2 2 2 The
contents of the will need not be revealed to these persons.
(3) The testator must sign the will (or acknowledge the signature
if the testator had previously signed it) in the presence of these
three persons. 23
(4) If the testator indicates a reason for the testator's inability
to sign, any other person may sign as proxy for the testator if
the authorized proxy signs the testator's name at the latter's
direction and makes note of this on the will. 2 4
(5) The witnesses and the authorized person must attest the
will by signing it in the presence of the testator. 25 An "authorized
person" is defined as a person who has been admitted to practice
law before the courts of the state and who is in good standing
as an active law practitioner in the state, 226 or as a person who
is empowered to supervise the execution of international wills
according to the laws of the United States. 227
The formalities are of such a protective nature that it would
be of no risk to Arkansas's concepts of necessary formalities to
220. Id.
221. Id. § 2-1003(a).
222. Id. § 2-1003(b).
223. Id. § 2-1003(c).
224. Id. § 2-1003(d).
225. Id. § 2-1003(e).
226. Id. § 2-1009.
227. Id. § 2-1001(2).
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adopt these provisions, particularly in an increasingly internationalized
world.
H. Will Preservation and Retrieval
Both Arkansas law and the Code provide a confidential public
depository system. Under rules to be established by each court, the
Code provides that a testator or testator's agent may deposit a will
with any court for purposes of protective preservation. 221 In order
to maintain confidentiality, the Code provides that only the testator
or the testator's agent, authorized in writing, may obtain repossession
of the will.229 Although the testator's conservator may also be allowed
to examine the will, the court is to set strict procedures designed
to maintain the confidentiality of the will.230 Under such procedures,
for example, the conservator is not to be given possession of the
will but only to be permitted to examine it.231 Upon the completion
of this examination, the will must be resealed and left on deposit. 23 2
Arkansas has a similar provision 233 but it does not cover the conservator
situation.
Under both approaches, when the court is informed of the
testator's death, it is to notify any person who is designated to
receive the will and to deliver the will to that person on request.2 14
In the alternative, the court may deliver the will to the appropriate
court. 235 The Arkansas provision, however, unnecessarily requires
that the will be "publicly opened" thirty days after death if it is
not delivered to the designated person. 23 6
In addition, both Arkansas law237 and the Code238 contain
provisions designed to force any person who has possession of a
will to deliver it to the appropriate court or person. Under the
Code, a custodian of a will of a testator who has died is, on the
request of an interested person, under a duty to deliver with reasonable





233. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-108 (Michie 1987).
234. U.P.C. § 2-515 (1990) (amended 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-108(d)
(Michie 1987).
235. U.P.C. § 2-515 (1990) (amended 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-108(d)
(Michie 1987).
236. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-108(d) (Michie 1987).
237. Id. § 28-40-105.
238. U.P.C. § 2-516 (1990) (amended 1993).
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promptness any will of the testator either to a person who is able
to secure its probate or to an appropriate court if no such person
is known. 239 Willful failure to deliver a will causes the custodian to
be liable to any person who suffers damages as a consequence of
that failure. 240 A custodian may also be found in contempt of court
if the custodian willfully refuses or fails to deliver a will, after being
required to do so by a court order issued as a result of a proceeding
specifically brought to compel delivery. 24 Arkansas law is similar
except it requires that the person having custody of a decedent
testator's will must deliver it to the court that has jurisdiction of
the estate or to the executor named in the will.2 42 The Code's
requirement, on the other hand, is dependent on the request of an
interested person.
I. No Contest or Claim Clauses
Occasionally, testators desire to discourage will contests or estate
litigation by including anti-contest or anti-claim clauses in their
wills. 243 Litigation has arisen interpreting the validity of such clauses
when devisees contest a will or file a claim against the estate. 244
Usually the issue is whether the devisee can take a gift in the will
despite the devisee's unsuccessful contest or claim against the estate.
Under current Arkansas law, a contest by a devisee to a will
that includes an anti-contest clause is barred even if the contest was
brought with probable cause. 245 The Code, on the other hand, codifies
the rule found in many states that an anti-contest or anti-claim
clause in a will is unenforceable against an interested person if that
person had probable cause to institute the proceeding. 246 The results
from these two approaches will not be different in most cases.
Because the devisee obviously lost the contest, the devisee will not
ordinarily be able to establish probable cause. The Code's approach




242. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-105(a) (Michie 1987).
243. See ATKINSON, supra note 33, § 82, at 408-413
244. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, § 9.1 reporter's note; Annotation,
Validity and Enforceability of Provision of Will or Trust Instrument for Forfeiture
or Reduction of Share of Contesting Beneficiary, 23 A.L.R.4th 369 (1983).
245. Lytle v. Zebold, 235 Ark. 17, 357 S.W.2d 20 (1962).
246. U.P.C. § 3-905 (1990) (amended 1993); replicated in U.P.C. § 2-517 (1990)
(amended 1993).
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An inherent characteristic of a will is the power of the testator
to revoke it.247 Just as statutes specifically prescribe the procedure
by which wills must be executed, statutes typically prescribe the
procedure by which wills must be revoked. The three generally
accepted revocation methods are: (1) by physical act; (2) by sub-
sequent instrument; and (3) by operation of law due to changed
circumstances. 24 The first two methods require three principal ele-
ments that must occur concurrently: (1) an authorized act or in-
strument; (2) an intent on the part of the testator to revoke; and
(3) a testator possessing legal capacity. Revocation by operation of
law springs not from intentional acts on the document or subsequent
testamentary documents but from changed circumstances between
the date of the will's execution and the date of the testator's death.
It springs automatically from the happening of these events. Both
Arkansas law and the Code recognize and define all three of these
methods.
Each revocation method creates a formality against which the
testator's intent must be evaluated and compared. If the conditions
of these methods of revocations are not obeyed, the will is not
successfully revoked and the identifiable intent of the testator will
be defeated. The best example would be a testator who has verbally
expressed to others, including non-interested persons, that the testator
presently revokes a previous will but the testator performs neither
a physical act nor executes a subsequent revocatory instrument.
Although it may be argued that because no physical act or subsequent
instrument was executed the testator's intent was merely formative
and not determinative, one may also conclude that the testator's
intent was not followed. Consequently, as with execution formalities,
revocation formalities must be limited to the minimum degree nec-
essary to protect the purposes of the formalities.
B. Revocation by Physical Act
The Arkansas provision for revocation by physical act merely
provides that a will may be revoked "[b]y being burned, torn,
247. U.P.C. § 2-507 (1990) (amended 1993).
248. ATKINSON, supra note 33, § 84.
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cancelled, obliterated, or destroyed, with the intent and for the
purpose of revoking it by the testator or by another person in his
presence and by his direction."2 49
Although similar in technique, the Code is more explicit in
application. Under the Code, a testator may revoke a will or any
part of a will by performing certain revocatory acts on the will. 250
A revocatory act includes burning, tearing, canceling, obliterating,
and destroying.25' The revocatory act may be performed by another
person if that person performs the act in the testator's conscious
presence and by the testator's direction.25 2 A "conscious presence"
test was specifically adopted in order to eliminate a line of sight
test some courts have applied when "in the presence" is required
by the statute. 25 3 The Code attempts to prevent restrictive
interpretations of the revocatory acts by providing specifically that
a burning, tearing, or canceling is a revocatory act whether or not
the burning, tearing, or canceling touches the actual words of the
will. 25 4 This means that although some form of physical evidence
of revocation must appear on the will itself, front or back, the act
need not deface the printed words on the instrument. Consequently,
courts must be cautious about claims of physical revocation and
should require adequate proof with extrinsic evidence, including the
testator's statements, if any, that the testator intended a revocatory
act to constitute a physical revocation.
Comparison: Under both Arkansas law and the Code, the
revocatory acts must be performed with the intent and for the purpose
of revoking the will or a part of it. The Code is more explicit as
to the meaning of the acts and is thus preferred.
C. Revocation by Subsequent Instrument
Under Arkansas law, a will or any part of a will is revoked
"by a subsequent will which revokes the prior will or part expressly
or by inconsistency. ' 255
Again the Code is similar in technique but more explicit in
application. Under the Code, revocation by a subsequent instrument
249. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-109(2) (Michie 1987).
250. U.P.C. § 2-507(a)(2) (1990) (amended 1993).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. § 2-507 cmt.
254. Id.
255. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-109(l) (Michie 1987).
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is also recognized when accomplished by an instrument executed
with the same formalities as any valid will. 2 6 Revocation of any
prior will by this method may also be accomplished in whole or in
part 257
A commonly litigated situation concerns whether revocation
occurs by execution of a subsequent will which is inconsistent in
whole or in part with a prior will, but which does not specifically
revoke the prior will.25 The proper characterizations of the relevant
issues are whether the subsequent inconsistencies revoke the prior
will or its provisions, or whether the prior will or its provisions are
merely superseded by the subsequent inconsistent will or its provisions.
Of course, if both wills are probated after the testator's death, the
provisions and terms of the subsequent will prevail. If, however,
the subsequent will is revoked before the testator's death, determination
of whether the prior will was revoked or merely superseded is
important. If the subsequent will merely superseded the prior will,
revocation of the subsequent inconsistent will or its provisions
reinstates the prior will or its provisions. If the prior will is held
to have been revoked, however, that will or its provisions will be
effective again only if re-executed or the doctrine of revival is
applicable.
Under the Code, the concept of revocation by inconsistency is
explained. 25 9
(1) A previous will is revoked by inconsistency if the testator
intended the subsequent will to replace rather than supplement
the previous will.
(2) Extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove this intent.2 60
(3) If there is no evidence, the testator is presumed to have
intended revocation rather than supplementation of the previous
will if the subsequent will makes a complete disposition of thc
testator's estate.26' If the previous will does not make a complete
disposition, the testator is presumed to have intended a subsequent
will to be merely supplemental rather than revocatory of a previous
will.262
256. U.P.C. § 2-507(a)(1) (1990) (amended 1993).
257. Id.
258. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 33.2 reporter's note (1990).
259. U.P.C. § 2-507(b)-(d) (1990) (amended 1993).
260. Id. § 2-507 cmt.
261. Id. § 2-507(c).
262. Id. § 2-507(d).
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(4) Either presumption may be rebutted on a clear and convincing
standard by extrinsic evidence. If not rebutted, the presumption
stands.
Comparison: The Arkansas Code provisions are similar except
the Code meritoriously addresses the evidence and presumption
questions.
D. Revocation by Changed Circumstances
At common law, revocation by operation of law was recognized
in two situations: a single woman's will was revoked when she
subsequently married, and a single man's will was revoked after his
marriage and birth of an issue. 63 No other change of circumstances
would revoke a will by operation of law.
In Arkansas, divorce revokes provisions of a will in favor of
the divorced spouse. 2" In addition, a spouse who is convicted of
first or second degree murder of his or her spouse "shall not be
endowed in the real or personal" property of the decedent's estate. 265
Under the Code, the revocatory effect of changed circumstances
on wills is limited also to divorce by a spouse and to the testator's
homicide by a devisee. 26 No other change of circumstances shall be
deemed to revoke a will by operation of law. Other provisions
thoroughly define the meaning and scope of the key terms, "divorce"
and "homicide" and what happens to the property if the revocation
occurs. 267 In addition, these revocatory consequences are applicable
to inter vivos transactions as well, giving definiteness to will
substitutes.268
Comparison: The Code is comprehensive on these matters. The
uncertainty of these topics under Arkansas law leaves doubt and
thereby may cause expensive litigation. 269
263. ATKINSON, supra note 33, § 85.
264. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-109(b) (Michie 1987).
265. Id. § 28-11-204.
266. U.P.C. § 2-508 (1990) (amended 1993).
267. Id. §§ 2-802, 2-804, 2-803.
268. Id.
269. See, e.g., Wright v. Wright, 248 Ark. 105, 449 S.W.2d 952 (1990); Luecke
v. Mercantile Bank, 286 Ark. 304, 691 S.W.2d 843 (1985).
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E. Revival of Revoked Wills
When a testator has executed two wills, the latter expressly or
by inconsistency revoking the former, and still later the testator
destroys the second will and retains the first will intact, should the
first will be probated? This is a problem of "revival" and various
rules have been formulated to deal with it. 2 0
Both Arkansas law and the Code have provisions concerning
this issue. The Arkansas provision severely restricts revival to re-
execution.2 7 1 It provides that no revoked or invalid will, or part
thereof, can be revived except by a re-execution of the will, or by
the execution of another will in which the revoked or invalid will
or part thereof is incorporated by reference. 27 2
The Code's revival provision adopts a flexible system of contrary
presumptions. Separate rules apply depending upon whether the
subsequent will wholly revokes the previous will or merely partly
revokes the previous will. 73 If a physically revoked subsequent will
wholly revokes the previous will, revival occurs only when those
who seek revival present evidence that the testator intended the
previous will to be revived. 274 This puts the burden on those seeking
revival of the previous will. The Code permits extrinsic evidence,
including statements by the testator to be admissible to prove intent.
Revival intent means an intent that the previous will is to take effect
as executed. Information concerning the testator's knowledge of the
contents of the previous will is relevant evidence.
With regard to a physically revoked subsequent will that only
partly revokes a previous will, the Code adopts the rule that revival
is presumed unless those who contend that no revival occurred
introduce evidence showing the testator did not intend revival of
the prior instrument.2 75 This puts the burden on those seeking
nonrevival of the previous will. The Code permits extrinsic evidence,
including statements by the testator, to be admissible to prove intent.
If no evidence is introduced or if the evidence is inconclusive,
however, the prior will is deemed to be revived. Again, extrinsic
evidence, including statements by the testator, is admissible to
determine the testator's intent.
270. ATKINSON, supra note 33, § 92; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY
§ 33.2 reporter's note (1990).
271. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-110 (Michie 1987).
272. Id.
273. U.P.C. § 2-509 (1990) (amended 1993).
274. Id. § 2-509(a).
275. Id. § 2-509(b).
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Comparison: The Code's approach is preferred because it is
more comprehensive and is more likely to give effect to the testator's
intent. Although clear as to outcome in most revival situations, the
restrictive Arkansas revival provision probably denies clear intent in
many cases.
VI. PARAMETERS OF THE STATUTE OF WILLS
A. General Considerations on Parameters
Several doctrines help define the will. They are each separate
techniques that substitute special requirements for the formalities of
the Statute of Wills. In their own way, they allow evidence or
documents to be used in determining the content or meaning of an
underlying will. Many states, like Arkansas, do not have statutory
provisions covering all of these doctrines. The Code meritoriously
gives these important concepts both meaning and recognition.
B. Incorporation by Reference
Both Arkansas law and the Code have basically the same
provision. The provision permits an unexecuted document or
instrument to be incorporated for specific purposes into a validly
executed will. 27 6 In order to avoid obvious possibilities of fraud, five
prerequisites must be satisfied in order for the doctrine to apply.
They include: (1) a validly executed will, (2) a distinct reference to
the unexecuted document in the will itself, (3) proof that the document
was actually in existence at the time of execution, (4) a showing of
intent on the part of the testator to incorporate the document into
the will, and (5) a showing that the document offered is the one
referred to in the will. 277 The essence of the doctrine is the
determination that the testator intended to incorporate the document
into the will. Both laws require that the language of the will "manifest"
this intent.
Comparison: Incorporation by reference is a concept frequently
used in estate planning. Its codification and elaboration are beneficial.
C. Testamentary Additions to Trusts
Both Arkansas and the Code have provisions that come from
the Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trust Act (Trust Act). 278
276. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-107(a) (Michie 1987); U.P.C. § 2-510 (1990)
(amended 1993).
277. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-107(a) (Michie 1987); U.P.C. § 2-510 (1990)
(amended 1993).
278. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-27-101 (Michie 1987); U.P.C. § 2-511 (1990) (amended
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These provisions permit the testator by will to add ("pour-over")
assets to an existing trust, without setting forth the entire terms of
the trust in the will itself and without causing the assets already in
the trust to be administered as part of the probate estate. 279 The
''pour-over" may be to: a revocable trust set up during the lifetime
by the testator or by some other person (such as a spouse or parent);
a life insurance trust, funded or unfunded; to an irrevocable trust
in existence at the testator's death; or a trust created under the will
of another person who has predeceased the testator. It is not necessary
that the trust be established when the will is executed. Both Arkansas
law and the Code now have the revised version of the Trust Act
that clarifies several points and increases the flexibility of the
doctrine.280 The newer version is preferred.
D. Events of Independent Significance
This doctrine is generally not codified. The doctrine permits
certain evidence outside the will to be admitted in order to determine
who receives and what property passes under the testator's will.28I
A statement of its principle is that if a fact, be it an act or event,
has significance other than to pass property at death, this significance
entitles that fact to control and to determine the disposition of the
property. The above principle applies regardless of whether the
testator or third persons can affect the act or event subsequent to
the will's execution. 28 2 Typical examples of the application of the
doctrine are the common use in wills of such terms as "children,"
"cousins," "brothers and sisters," the "residue" and "all my
property." In order to determine the meaning of each of these words
or phrases, it is necessary to look at facts outside the face of the
will; however, because these words have obvious significance beyond
their use to pass property at death, extrinsic evidence is admitted
to show their meaning.
For uniformity and clarity purposes, the Code includes a provision
that codifies a broad statement of the common law rule.28 3 This
1993). The revised version of this Uniform Act was enacted by the 1995 Arkansas
General Assembly effective to wills of persons who die after July 31, 1995. 1995
Ark. Acts 751.
279. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-27-101 (Michie 1987); U.P.C. § 2-511 (1990) (amended
1993).
280. 1995 Ark. Acts 751 (effective to wills of persons who die after July 31,
1995); U.P.C. § 2-511 (1990) (amended 1993).
281. 2 BOWE & PARKER, supra note 144, § 19.34.
282. ATKINSON, supra note 33, § 81.
283. U.P.C. § 2-512 (1990) (amended 1993).
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provision is applicable to acts or events that occur not only before
or after the execution of the will, but also that occur after the
testator's death. Under its test, testamentary dispositions may be
controlled by these acts and events only if the latter "have significance
apart from their effect upon the dispositions made by the will."
Although the Code generally leaves to the court the determination
of what comes within the Code's test, it does expressly state that
under the test the execution or revocation of another's will constitutes
such an event. This separate and specific rule permits a testator to
dispose of testator's property according to the terms of another's
will notwithstanding that the other's will was executed before or
after the testator's will. Arkansas has no statute or case law on the
subject. It would be preferable to codify the doctrine of independent
significance as the Code has done.
E. References to Separate Writings
Both Arkansas law284 and the Code285 permit, under limited
circumstances and with explicit restrictions, a separate writing to
dispose of certain tangible personal property notwithstanding the
fact that the writing does not satisfy any will execution procedure,
the incorporation by reference doctrine, or the events of independent
significance doctrine. The Code's requirements for such a writing
are as follows:
(1) The writing must be signed by the testator (Arkansas allows
handwritten writings in the testator's hand to substitute for a
signature); 286
(2) The items disposed of and the devisees must be described
with reasonable certainty;
(3) The items disposed of must be tangible personal property;
(4) The tangible personal property items disposed of must not
otherwise be specifically disposed of by the testator's will; and
(5) There must be a reference to this writing in a properly
executed will of the testator.
If these requirements are satisfied, it makes no difference whether
the writing comes into existence before or after the execution of
the will, whether the writing is actually altered by the testator after
the execution of the will, or whether the writing has significance
other than its effect on the dispositions made in the will.
284. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-107(b) (Michie 1987).
285. U.P.C. § 2-513 (1990) (amended 1993).
286. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-107(b)(2) (Michie 1987).
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One important limitation on the use of this type of transfer
device is that it is limited to the disposition of tangible personal
property. The provision specifically prohibits the use of this device
for the disposition of money. 287 This limitation on the type of
disposable property by inference also bars its use to dispose of
evidences of indebtedness, documents of title, securities, and property
used in trade or business.2 8
On the whole, the recognition of such a device is justified on
the grounds that it is in line with the policies of giving effect to
the testator's intent and of relaxing execution formalities. 219
Considering the limitation placed upon the type and extent of property
that may be disposed of in this manner, problems of fraud, duress
and undue influence are not serious considerations. One of the most
beneficial aspects of this provision is to provide a convenient and
simple device for persons who desire to change wills frequently with
respect to devises of tangible personal property and effects. This
informal device appears to be popular both with clients and practicing
attorneys.
VII. PROTECTIONS FOR THE FAMILY AND RESTRICTIONS ON
TESTATION
A. The Family Protections
It is common for states to have statutes that attempt to fi-
nancially protect a decedent's family unit. These statutes typically
provide specified surviving family members of a decedent with a
minimal amount of protection both from the decedent's creditors
and from the decedent's own intentional disinheritance. Although
these statutes come in a variety of kinds and names, they are
commonly broken down into three categories: (1) homesteads, (2)
exemptions, and (3) allowances. Both Arkansas law29° and the Code29'
contain a representative for all three categories of the above family
protections.
Family protections serve two primary purposes. First, they pre-
clude disinheritance to the extent of their monetary limitations.
Second, they provide their beneficiaries with protection against a
decedent's unsecured creditors-the family protections are all ex-
pressly exempt from, and are in priority to, all unsecured claims
against the estate.
287. Id. § 28-25-107(b)(1); U.P.C. § 2-513 (1990) (amended 1993).
288. U.P.C. § 2-513 cmt. (1990) (amended 1993).
289. Id.
290. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-39-101, -102 (Michie 1987).
291. U.P.C. §§ 2-401 to -405.
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1. Homestead
In Arkansas, homestead rights are granted under the state
constitution.2 92 They may be claimed only by a surviving spouse
and/or minor children. The constitution limits the homestead to 160
acres, provided the value does not exceed $2,500, or to eighty acres
without regard to value, if the homestead is located "outside any
city, town, or village"; and to one acre, provided the value does
not exceed $2,500, or to one-fourth acre without regard to value,
if the homestead is in a "city, town, or village." The surviving
spouse and/or minor children are entitled to occupy the land and
to receive any rents and profits derived from it during the life of
the surviving spouse or the minority of the children.
The Code provides for a $15,000 monetary homestead allowance
either for the surviving spouse or, if there is no surviving spouse,
an equal shaie of the allowance for each minor child and each
dependent child of the deceased. 293 The Code also includes an optional
provision that coordinates its homestead allowance with any existing
state constitutional homestead right tied to the family home, i.e.,
the value of the family home is charged against the Code's monetary
homestead allowance. 29
Comparison: While the Arkansas provision may result in the
awarding of a very valuable right to the surviving spouse, it is not
well adapted to modern circumstances. It exists only if there is real
property upon which the family resides in the decedent spouse's
estate and only if it has not been waived. It is therefore inapplicable
where the family occupied rental property, or where they occupied
mortgaged property if (as is usually the case) homestead was waived.
Additionally, the surviving spouse cannot sell his or her homestead
rights if the spouse desires to live elsewhere. Therefore, many families
will not benefit from the allowance. The Code provision, on the
other hand, is applicable to all its specified beneficiaries because it
simply provides for a cash payment.
2. Exempt Property Allowance
Arkansas grants the surviving spouse the right to $2,000 of
personal property of the decedent, to be selected by her from the
estate. 295 The value is reduced to $1,000 if the estate is insolvent.
292. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-39-202; ARK. CONST. art. 9, §§ 4-6, 10.
293. U.P.C. § 2-402 (1990) (amended 1993).
294. Id. § 2-402A.
295. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-39-101 (Michie 1987).
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If there is no surviving spouse, the minor children of the decedent
receive this property. And, if the decedent is survived by a surviving
spouse and by one or more children who are not children of the
surviving spouse, this allowance goes one-half to the surviving spouse
and one-half, in equal shares, to the decedent's minor children. In
addition to this property, a surviving spouse is entitled to "such
furniture, furnishings, appliances, implements, and equipment" as
is necessary to the use and occupancy of the dwelling, provided the
surviving spouse was living with the decedent at the time of his or
her death.2 9 This provision takes priority over claims by heirs and
creditors.
The Code provides a $10,000 exempt property allowance in
favor of either the surviving spouse or the decedent's children if
there is no surviving spouse.2 97 Significantly, the children need not
be minors or dependents of the decedent.-The exempt property
allowances will ordinarily first be charged against household furniture,
automobiles, furnishings, appliances, and personal effects.2 9 If the
value of these assets, less security interest held by third parties
against them, does not equal the specified monetary amount, however,
the protected beneficiaries are entitled to other assets of the estate
to the extent necessary to make up the difference.
Comparison: The major difference in the two provisions is the
larger amount of exempt property that the Code allows. Because
of the provisions allowing the surviving spouse "such furniture,
furnishings, appliances, implements, and equipment," however, the
Arkansas statute may sometimes result in a larger allowance. The
Code provides for a uniform allowance for all families and allows
selection of the full amount of the exempt property. Additionally,
the granting of this property to the decedent's children in the absence
of a surviving spouse may be significant if the estate is insolvent
or the testator has disinherited his or her children.
3. Family Allowance
In Arkansas, the payment of allowances for the family of the
decedent are limited to $500 and are payable only in the first two
months after the death of the decedent. 299 These payments are available
only to a surviving spouse and minor children. Several other types
296. Id. § 28-39-101(b).
297. U.P.C. § 2-403 (1990) (amended 1993).
298. Id. § 3-906(a)(1).
299. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-39-101(c), -102 to -105 (Michie 1987).
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of allowances to a decedent's family are also provided: the surviving
spouse may reside in the chief residence of the deceased spouse for
two months without paying rent and during this time the surviving
spouse shall have a reasonable sustenance from the decedent's estate.
If the surviving spouse's dower is not assigned during this two
month period, the spouse is entitled to remain in the "mansion or
chief dwelling house . . . together with the farm thereto attached"
until his or her dower is assigned. Moreover, until the assignment
of dower, the spouse is entitled to be awarded the rent of the real
estate in proportion to his or her interest in it. Payments from the
estate to minor distributees are permitted during the course of
administration if the estate is solvent. Any such payment is to be
deducted from the distributee's share.
For purposes of support and maintenance during the period of
administration, the Code provides for the payment from the estate
of a reasonable monetary allowance for the benefit of the surviving
spouse, minor legal dependents and other actually dependent
children.3°° The allowance may be paid either to the surviving spouse
or, if there is no surviving spouse, to the children or dependents
or their guardians. °0 When a child or dependent does not live with
the surviving spouse, however, the allowance may be apportioned
between the surviving spouse and the child or other dependent as
their respective needs require.30 2 Any allowance may be paid in a
lump sum or in periodic installments. 303 A protected person's death
terminates the right to the family allowance, even including approved
unpaid amounts.3°4 If the estate is insolvent, an allowance cannot
continue for more than one year from the decedent's death.305
Comparison: The Arkansas provisions are insufficient and will
not accomplish what they are intended to accomplish. The Code's
breadth and protective amounts meet modern needs.
B. Financial Protection for the Surviving Spouse
1. General Considerations
With rare exceptions, states have enacted statutes which in some
manner protect the surviving spouse from disinheritance by the
decedent spouse. 3°6




304. Id. § 2-404(b).
305. Id. § 2-404(a).
306. ATKINSON, supra note 33, § 33. These statutes can be generally and broadly
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2. The Spouse's Elective Share
In Arkansas, a surviving spouse may elect against the decedent
spouse's will to receive his or her "dower.'' 307 As discussed above
in the section on intestacy, dower will vary according to the nature
of the property (land or personal property), the existence of
descendants of the decedent spouse, and the source of the property.
Where there are surviving descendants of the decedent, the surviving
spouse will receive an absolute interest in one-third of his or her
personalty and a life estate in one-third of decedent's land. Where
there are no descendants, the surviving spouse's share increases to
one-half of personalty absolutely, one-half of "new acquisitions" in
fee, and one-third of "ancestral property" for life.308
While dower is designed to give the surviving spouse a nonbarrable
share of the decedent spouse's property, it provides protection against
inter vivos transfers of land only. Personal property of the decedent
may be transferred without the spouse's consent, as dower attaches
only to personal property which the decedent owns at death.3 9 Dower
in real estate is an "inchoate" right during the decedent's life and
the surviving spouse receives dower in all lands which the decedent
spouse owned during marriage unless the spouse consented to the
transfer. 10 In an Arkansas Supreme Court case,3 ' the court indicated
that any inter vivos transfer of personal property challenged by a
surviving spouse would be voided if it was made in "fraud" of the
surviving spouse's rights.
The election procedure provides for notice by the clerk of the
court of the right to elect within one month of the admission of
categorized into three types: statutory dower, forced share, and community property.
Within each category there is a large variety of methods and combinations. Several
examples include (1) the common law dower estate limited to a life interest in one-
third of the decedent spouse's realty; (2) a similar interest in both realty and
personalty; (3) an election in lieu of dower of a fractional fee or forced share
interest in the entire estate; (4) a similar forced share interest without a dower
election; and (5) a one-half interest in the community property. ATKINSON, supra
note 33, § 33. The fractional interest among these categories range from one-third
to one-half or is sometimes tied into the surviving spouse's intestate share. Depending
upon the type, the shares are sometimes exempt from the decedent's creditors'
claims and sometimes not exempt. They may also differ as to whether the surviving
spouse must make an election against the will to obtain a share or must renounce
the share in order to take under decedent's estate plan.
307. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-39-401(a) (Michie 1987).
308. Id. §§ 28-11-101, -301, -305.
309. Smith v. Lamb, 87 Ark. 344, 112 S.W. 884 (1908).
310. Id.
311. Richards v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 261 Ark. 890, 552 S.W.2d 228
(1977).
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the will to probate. The spouse must file the election, in the form
specified by the statute, within one month after the expiration of
the time for filing claims.31 2 The right of election is personal and
does not survive the spouse's death. 3 The guardian of an incompetent
surviving spouse may exercise the election, but must be authorized
to do so by the court.11 4
Under the Code, dower and curtesy are abolished.3"5 In addition,
the Code's election applies only if the decedent was domiciled at
death in the Code state. Otherwise the spousal protection laws of
the decedent's domicile state control those rights. 1 6 If the domicile
state's requirement is met, then the surviving spouse may elect to
take a sliding scaled percentage of the "augmented estate.131 7 The
surviving spouse is entitled to the family protections in addition to
the elective share protection.318
The opportunity to take this elective share exists whether the
decedent died intestate, testate with a will which disinherits the
surviving spouse, or testate with a will which gives all or part of
the estate to the surviving spouse. The decision to elect depends
upon three determinations: (1) the elective share amount; (2) the
determination of the augmented estate; and (3) the satisfaction of
the elective share amount.
The Code adopts an accrual-type elective share. 1 9 The method
of accrual employs a rational rising percentage scale based upon the
length of the marriage.3 20 The elective share percentage ascends from
a low of three percent of the augmented estate after the first year
of marriage to a high of fifty percent of the augmented estate after
fifteen years of marriage.3 21 At the end of fifteen years, each spouse
has earned a fifty percent interest at death in each of the other's
entire estate. In addition, regardless of the length of the marriage,
the Code includes a supplemental or minimum safety-net monetary
amount of $50,000 for a surviving spouse. 22
312. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-39-402, -403 (Michie 1987).
313. Id. § 28-39-405.
314. Id.
315. U.P.C. § 2-113 (1990) (amended 1993).
316. Id. § 2-202(d).
317. Id. § 2-202(a).
318. Id. § 2-202(c). See supra notes 293-305 and accompanying text.
319. U.P.C., art. II, pt. 2, general cmt. (1990) (amended 1993).
320. Id. § 2-202(a).
321. Id. The Code's incremental percentage accrues at the rate of three percent
per year for the first ten years and then four percent per year for the next five
years.
322. Id. § 2-202(b).
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After determining the appropriate elective share, it is necessary
to identify an estate against which the elective share will be computed
and funded. The Code calls this estate the "augmented estate. 3 23
It starts with the decedent's estate that is subject to administration
through a decedent's estate and that passes at decedent's death either
by intestacy or by testacy. To be fully effective, however, the spousal
protection statute must take into account certain inter vivos transfers
of the decedent spouse. Consequently, the Code includes in the
augmented estate what it calls the decedent's nonprobate estate.124
If this strategy is not effected, persons determined to disinherit their
spouses could easily transfer their assets to third persons through
the use of relatively frail inter vivos transactions or of probate estate
purging transfers on their deathbed or in near deathbed situations.
A law that permits easy and unburdensome avoidance establishes
too vast a loophole and encourages disinheritance even in the most
undesirable situation.
Concomitantly, the Code prevents the surviving spouse from
receiving more than the circumstances merit. Thus, the surviving
spouse must include in the augmented estate both the assets derivable
from the decedent as a result of the latter's death and all of the
surviving spouse's personal assets including the surviving spouse's
comparable nonprobate transfers to others.325 The calculated value
of the surviving spouse's interests are deducted prior to the taking
of assets of other beneficiaries of the augmented estate.126 These
latter inclusions and deductions discourage elections by surviving
spouses in marriages of short duration and where the surviving
spouse has substantial personal assets. Finally, recognizing an
underlying philosophy of freedom of disposition and clarity of title
and ownership, the Code excludes several categories of nonmarital
interests and completed lifetime transfers made by either spouse.3 27
In order to take the elective share, the surviving spouse must
file in court and mail to the personal representative a petition for
such share within nine months after the date of death or within six
months after decedent's will is probated, whichever limitation last
expires.3 28 Notwithstanding these overall limitation periods, nonprobate
assets will only be included in the augmented estate if the petition
323. Id. § 2-203.
324. Id. § 2-205.
325. Id. §§ 2-206, 2-207.
326. Id. § 2-209.
327. Id. § 2-208.
328. Id. § 2-211.
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is filed within nine months after the date of death. The elective
share procedure requires that there be full notice and a hearing.
Notice of time and place of the hearing must be given by the
surviving spouse to all persons interested in the estate and to
distributees and recipients whose interests will be adversely affected
by the elective share petition. The court then has the responsibility
for determining the elective share, its satisfaction, and the liability
of recipients for contribution.3 29
A petition demanding the elective share may be withdrawn by
the surviving spouse any time before entry of a final determination.330
In addition, the right of election is personal to the surviving spouse
and cannot be exercised by anyone else before or after the surviving
spouse's death; however, it may be exercised on behalf of the
surviving spouse by a conservator, guardian, or agent under a power
of attorney.'
Comparison: The differences between the two spousal protection
systems are so great that a detailed comparison would be too long
for this summary. The principal differences that deserve mention
are the differences in the amount of the protection and the types
of assets to which the protection applies. Arkansas law is too
restrictive in both regards. The Code recognizes the economic
partnership of marriage and that spouses ought to be treated as
economic partners in their respective spouse's assets. The Code share
depends on the length of the marriage. The longer the marriage,
the greater the share until it equals fifty percent. In addition, the
Code addresses the real problems of spousal disinheritance by
recognizing that certain lifetime transfers must be considered when
and if protection is necessary. It further recognizes that surviving
spouses who have significant wealth, whether obtained individually
or derived from the decedent spouse, should not be able to take
an undue share from the estate or disrupt an otherwise reasonable
estate plan. This is the way a spousal protection provision should
operate. It provides the spouse with the ability to plan an estate
properly to coincide with the spousal protection provision.
C. Unintentional Disinheritance of Spouses and Children
1. Unintentional Disinheritance of Spouses and Children
Occasionally, the problem of disinheritance is not intentional
but inadvertent. States have enacted a variety of legislation to deal
329. Id. § 2-211(d).
330. Id. § 2-211(c).
331. Id. § 2-212(a); see id. § 5-407(b)(3).
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with this problem. Most states do not treat inadvertent disinheritance
of the spouse any differently than intentional disinheritance. These
states, like Arkansas, rely on their spousal protection statutes to
resolve the problem. All states, however, have a form of the
pretermitted332 heir statute that attempts to prevent inadvertent
disinheritance of a decedent's children or descendants. The Code
contains a special remedy for both of these situations.
2. Pretermitted Spouse
Under the Code, if a surviving spouse is a pretermitted or
omitted spouse, the spouse is entitled to a spouse's intestate share
valued at no less than the value the spouse would have received if
the testator had died intestate.333 The provision's facial application
depends solely on whether the marriage to a surviving spouse occurred
after the will was executed.3 4 This is not an election on the part
of the surviving spouse but an intestacy right. It is not avoided
merely because the spouse was a devisee under the will. The only
consequence of the spouse being a devisee is that the spouse must
deduct the devise from the intestacy share required by the statute.335
This intestate share is limited, however, to the portion of the testator's
estate that is not devised to one or more children of the testator
who were born before the marriage to the surviving spouse and who
are not children of the surviving spouse 3 6 Devises to children or
descendants of the child who take under the antilapse provisions
are also exempt from this share. 3 7
The Code recognizes several important exceptions to this intestacy
share right. First, there is no intestacy right if the will or other
evidence indicates it was made in contemplation of the testator's
marriage to the surviving spouse.3 8 Second, the testator may express
an intention that the will is effective notwithstanding subsequent
marriage or marriages.3 9 Third, the share does not apply if the
testator provided for the surviving spouse by way of transfers outside
the will and these transfers were intended in lieu of a testamentary
332. "Pretermission. The state of one who is pretermitted, as an heir or child
of the testator. The act of omitting a child or heir from a will." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1187 (6th ed. 1991).
333. U.P.C. § 2-301(a) (1990) (amended 1993).
334. Id. § 2-301(a).
335. Id. § 2-301(b).
336. Id.
337. See id. §§ 2-603, 2-604.
338. Id. § 2-301(a)(1).
339. Id. § 2-301(a)(2).
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provision.3 40 The latter intent may be shown by statements of the
testator or from reasonable inferences from the nature of the transfer
or other evidence.3 41 The burden of proof of satisfying any or all
of the exceptions is placed upon the moving party urging the
application of one or more of the exceptions.142
Arkansas does not have a comparable statute. The justification
for the Code's provision is that it attempts to do what most testators
probably would want to do had they contemplated the prior will
and the changed marital circumstances.3 43 In addition, the Code may
reduce the number of elections made against estates under the elective
share provisions.
3. Pretermitted Children
Except for the State of Louisiana, no jurisdiction within the
United States has an effective forced kinship provision in favor of
descendants and other heirs. Consequently, if one desires, one may
disinherit one's children or any other blood relatives.344 Although
this disinheritance power may be partially altered by the statutory
family protections, the closest and most common facsimile to forced
kinship provisions is one that protects pretermitted descendants. The
general rationale behind such provisions is that it is presumed the
testator did not intend to disinherit the descendant who is omitted
in the testator's will. Among the states which have such provisions,
their contents vary greatly as to who, when and how they are to
be applied. Both Arkansas law and the Code include pretermitted
heir provisions but they differ substantially.
The Arkansas provision applies not only to children born or
adopted after the execution of the will but also to any child or the
issue of any deceased child living at the time of execution who is
not mentioned either by name or as a member of a class.3 45 The
law is absolute, despite the fact that it is rather unlikely that a
testator who omits a child in fact does not intend to do so. The
"pretermitted" child or grandchild receives his or her intestate share.
The case law consistently holds that the actual intention of the
340. Id. § 2-301(a)(3).
341. Id.
342. Id. § 2-301 cmt.
343. Id.
344. ATKINSON, supra note 33, § 36.
345. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-39-407 (Michie 1987).
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testator is irrelevant.3 46 If a child or issue of a child is omitted, that
person takes an intestate share.3 47
Because pretermitted heir statutes are intended and designed to
prevent injustice and reduce will contests when unintentionally omitted
heirs survive a testator, the statute should be designed to accomplish
these goals. Unfortunately, some statutes that exist in non-Code
states, including Arkansas, have actually produced the opposite
results.3 4 Accordingly, the Code's provision contains very precise
prerequisites and limitations that are designed to reduce this litigation
and judicial misinterpretation.
Under the Code, conditional thresholds are established against
which each applicable situation must be tested. First, the protection
is limited to pretermitted children and does not protect disinheritance
of other descendants and relatives.3 49 Second, the child must be born
or adopted after the execution of the will that disinherits the child.350
Third, intent to disinherit must not appear on the "face of the
will." 35' Fourth, the disinherited or omitted child must not have
been provided for by transfers outside the will intended to be in
lieu of a testamentary provision.1 2 A liberal admissibility of extrinsic
evidence rule is adopted in regard to proof of intent to use
nontestamentary transfers in lieu of testamentary transfers. Extrinsic
evidence may include the testator's declarations, the value of the
transfer vis d vis the estate and "other evidence" that is relevant
to proof of intent.
If the threshold requirements are satisfied, the omitted child
must then test the section's protection against two factual
circumstances. The first standard applies to situations where the
testator had no children living when the will was executed. "3 The
second standard applies where the testator had one or more children
living when the will was executed. 5 4
in the first situation the ornitted child born or adopted after
the will was executed takes an intestate share from the estate unless
346. Armstrong v. Butler, 262 Ark. 31, 553 S.W.2d 453 (1977); Hare v. First
Security Bank, 261 Ark. 79, 546 S.W.2d 427 (1977).
347. Armstrong v. Butler, 262 Ark. 31, 553 S.W.2d 453 (1977).
348. The exclusion of extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent is an example
of such interpretations. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Butler, 262 Ark. 31, 553 S.W.2d
453 (1977); Hare v. First Security Bank, 261 Ark. 79, 546 S.W.2d 427 (1977).
349. U.P.C. § 2-302 (1990) (amended 1993).
350. Id. § 2-302(a)(1).
351. Id. § 2-302(b)(1).
352. Id. § 2-302(b).
353. Id. § 2-302(a)(1).
354. Id. § 2-302(a)(2).
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the natural or adopted child's parent is "devised all or substantially
all" of the estate, survives the testator, and is entitled to take under
the will. 55 The last condition concerns whether the will might have
been revoked by other law.
If testator had one or more children living when the will was
executed, the pretermitted child takes from the testator's estate only
if one or more of those existing children at the time of the will's
execution were devisees under the will and take a legal or equitable
interest in the estate. If pre-will children take, the pretermitted child
takes a representative pro rata share from the total value of the
interests devised to the pre-existing children. The interest of the pre-
existing children's devises abate pro rata according to their respective
interests. The nature of the interest accorded (e.g., legal, equitable,
present, or future), to the omitted child must conform to the extent
possible to the character of the devises to the pre-existing children.
In general, the character of the estate plan must be preserved to
the maximum degree possible.
Comparison: The Code provisions are preferable because of
their application specificity and greater reliance on testator's intent.
These provisions are intended to be intent-supplementing rather than
protective devices. In particular, the provision that an after-born or
after-adopted child may not claim a share under the provision if
the parent's will, written before the child's birth or adoption but
after the marriage, left "substantially all" of the estate to the after-
born child's surviving parent is important. This is a typical estate
plan in a small or medium sized estate, especially where there are
minor children, and the law should not be written to upset it.
4. Omission -Based on Mistaken Belief of Death of Child
Another Code provision allots an after-born child's share to a
child living when the will was executed, but who is omitted because
the testator believed the child to be dead.356 Arkansas has no specific
provision, but such a child would be "pretermitted," and entitled
to his or her elective share. The Code adopts a specific exception
to the general exclusionary evidence rule concerned with mistake in
the inducement. The admissibility and sufficiency of evidence
355. Id. § 2-302(a)(1). The assumption of this provision is that when the post-
will child's parent is the primary beneficiary of the will, that child should not be
able to take a share away from that spouse. Id. § 2-302 cmt.
356. Id. § 2-302(c). The share from the estate is limited in the same manner as
the share of an after-born or after-adopted child is limited. See id. § 2-302(a) and
(b).
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concerning such a belief are controlled by the general rules of evidence
and burden of proof of the Code state.357 The provision does not
protect the omitted child if the child would have been omitted had
the child been alive, or if the child had been provided for by transfers
outside the will intended to be in lieu of a testamentary gift. 358
Comparison: The Code's attempt to determine the testator's
intent rather than mechanically apply a rule of construction is
preferable.
V. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
A. Intent of the Testator
Inherently, a person's will, trust, or other dispositive instrument
is nothing more than an amalgamation of words structured so as
to communicate individual desires. In order to carry out an instru-
ment's purposes and effects, it is necessary to ascribe a meaning to
its words. When determining the meaning of words used in a will,
the cardinal principle is that the subjective intent of the testator,
as expressed in testator's will, if not against public policy, controls
the legal effect of the will's dispositions.35 9 Consequently, a testator
may ascribe a meaning to a word that is different from the word's
ordinary meaning. If the testator's own meaning can be determined,
it should control. When the testator's meaning cannot be determined
or is inadequately expressed, the interpreters must seek the meaning
of the word from other sources.
As with any area of law, there are frequently used words of
art or common recurring situations. Because of the frequency of
the use of these words or of the occurrence of the situations, the
law must develop uniform and set definitions and interpretations.
These definitions and interpretations serve two purposes: (1) they
provide a rule of construction for wills where the testator's expressed
intent is inadequate or lacking, and (2) they provide a set of uniform
rules that drafters of wills may incorporate by reference either
explicitly or implicitly. The real purpose of these Code provisions
is to affirm that all of the construction rules embodied in the
succeeding sections are merely presumptions and yield if the testator
expresses a different intent.
357. See id. § 2-601 cmt.
358. Id. § 2-302(b) and cmt.
359. Cf. id. § 2-601.
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The Code not only includes a long list of general definitions
that are useful for these purposes, 36 but also incorporates rules of
construction for many of the most common problems concerning
will interpretation and construction. 36' Arkansas has several examples
of these rules but not nearly as many as the Code. Presumably,
these rules of construction are based upon what the drafters deter-
mined the typical testator would desire if the testator had expressly
indicated that intent. Significantly, they do not apply if evidence
indicates testator had a contrary intention. 62
Because many of the rules of construction in this section are
applicable only to particular types of testamentary gifts, definitions
of the various classes of testamentary gifts are important. Due to
the absence of definitions of these terms in the Code, the common
law definitions are relevant. Generally, testamentary gifts are classified
into four different categories: specific, general, demonstrative, and
residuary devises.3 63 A specific devise is a gift of a specific item or
portion of the estate. A general devise is a gift of a set value or
generally described property which is to be charged against the whole
estate and not a specific portion. A demonstrative devise is a gift
payable out of the whole estate but which is in the first instance
charged against certain parts of the estate. A residuary devise is a
gift of the remainder of the estate.
B. After-Acquired Property
The Code provides that a will may pass all the testator's property
owned at death and acquired by the estate after testator's death.316
This rule codifies a part of the ambulatory nature of wills. The
provision also recognizes that decedents' estates may become entitled
to property after a testator's death such as inheritance to the estate
of a decedent and retirement or other post-employment benefits and
awards.3 65 Under the Arkansas statute, after-acquired property passes
under a will unless a contrary intention "manifestly appears" in the
will.366 The difference is one of nuance, which most courts would
ignore. Although the Arkansas statute does not contain the more
360. See id. § 1-201.
361. Id. art. II, pt. 6.
362. Id. § 2-601.
363. See 6 BOWE & PARKER, supra note 144, §§ 48.1-48.10; ATKINSON, supra
note 33, § 132.
364. U.P.C. § 2-602 (1990) (amended 1993).
365. See id. § 2-602 cmt.
366. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-26-102 (Michie 1987).
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general presumption that the will passes all of testator's property
which that person owns at death, modern courts use that presumption
without statutory base.3 67
C. Choice of Law
Choice of law determinations for testamentary and other donative
transfers frequently depend upon the type of property involved, the
donor's domicile, and the situs of the property.3 68 Although the
Code does not alter the ordinary choice of law rules, it provides
the transferor with the discretion to select a local law applicable to
the meaning and legal effect of the donative disposition.3 69 Under
ordinary circumstances, the Code permits the transferor by the terms
of the governing instrument to select and specify what local law
shall be applied in determining both the meaning and the legal effect
of a testamentary disposition of the transferor's property. This power
in the transferor to select the controlling law is effective regardless
of (1) whether the disposition is of personalty or of realty; (2) where
the property is located; and (3) whether the testator was domiciled
in the state whose law was selected either at the time the will was
executed, at the time of death, or at any time.
The only general limitation is that the law of the selected
jurisdiction cannot be contrary to the applicable public policy of
the Code state.3 70 In addition, the provision specifically prohibits a
locally domiciled transferor from making a choice of law that
circumvents the Code's elective share3 7' or family protection
provisions.3 72 Other policies that might fit within the general public
policy limitation include attempts to avoid taxation, future interest
rules with respect to real property, and creditor avoidance devices
such as spendthrift clauses.
This provision promotes several policies of the Code. First, by
permitting transferors to select the rules and laws to be applicable
to their donative instruments, it improves the chances that the
transferors' intentions will control the legal effect of their dispositions.
Second, it aligns testamentary choice of law rules with what is
367. At early common law a devise of real property could not operate to pass
after-acquired realty. Such a view of' the devise has long been obsolete. Patty v.
Goolsby, 51 Ark. 61, 9 S.W. 846 (1888).
368. ATKINSON, supra note 33, §§ 94, 145.
369. U.P.C. § 2-703 (1990) (amended 1993).
370. Id. § 2-703 cmt.
371. See id. art. II, pt. 2; AVERILL, supra note 5, §§ 6.01-6.03.
372. See U.P.C. art. II, pt. 4 (1990) (amended 1993); AVERILL, supra note 5,
§§ 8.01-8.03.
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generally permitted in dealing with inter vivos transactions including
trusts. The removal of differences between the way inter vivos
transactions and testamentary transactions are treated is one of the
goals of the Code and of recent conflict of laws theory. 73 And
third, the overall effect of this provision should encourage the use
of the will as a dispositive device.
Arkansas courts could reach the same result without a. specific
statute if the Restatement is followed, but courts are not likely to
do so unless the issue is competently briefed and argued by counsel
familiar with conflict of laws doctrine. The Code provision is
meritorious by providing the needed authority.
D. Lapse
Common law holds that when a devisee (including a legatee)
died between the execution of the will and the death of the testator,
the devise to that person lapses.3 74 If a devisee died before the
execution of the will, the devise is void.3 75 These characterizations
generate a constructional presumption providing that neither the dead
devisee nor that devisee's estate can take the devise. A lapsed or
void devise passes to others according to a set of other presumptions. 76
First, the devise passes to one or more devisees named as alternative
devisees including survivors of survivorship type devises such as class
gifts. If no alternative devisee is named, the devise passes to the
residuary devisee, if any. If no residuary devisee is named, or if
the residuary devise becomes void or lapses, the devise passes by
intestacy. All of these presumptions yield to a testator's expressions
of contrary intent. 177
Because lapse occurs more often than many testators have
anticipated and because lapse causes disinheritance of the devisee
and the devisee's relational stock, the vast majority of jurisdictions
in this country have enacted what are commonly referred to as
"'antilapse statutes. "378
373. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 139, 140, 263, 264 (1971).
374. 6 BOWE & PARKER, supra note 144, § 50.20.
375. 6 BOWE & PARKER, supra note 144, § 50.22.
376. ATKINSON, supra note 33, § 140.
377. The following methods are commonly used by testators to avert or resolve
these problems: (1) a testator makes the devise to several persons as joint tenants
expecting the survivorship of one or more of the joint tenants to prevent lapse;
(2) a testator specifically provides for alternative devises to other persons until the
likelihood of total failure of the devise is negligible; or (3) a testator uses class
gifts with their built-in survivorship presumptions. ATKINSON, supra note 33, § 140.
378. U.P.C. § 2-603 cmt. (1990) (amended 1993).
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Although called "antilapse statutes," they do not prevent lapse
but actually create a statutory substitute devise to the devisee's
descendants.37 9 Generally, these statutes permit the descendants of
certain classes of dead devisees to stand in their ancestor's place
for purposes of taking under a testator's will. They create a rule
of construction that may be altered by the testator. If a testator
intends for lapse to occur, it will occur and the devise will fail.
None of the statutes apply to all testamentary gifts and they vary
greatly in scope.
The Arkansas statute is limited to gifts to a child or grandchild
of the testator.3 10 It applies to class gifts (such as a devise of property
to "my children"), and applies "[ulnless a contrary intent is indicated
by the terms of the will."3' Other than this phrase, little guidance
is given concerning how to resolve a large number of constructional
problems.
The Code contains a comprehensive, although restricted, set of
constructional rules concerned with lapse and its related problems.3 2
Due to the multiplicity of issues that concern lapse, the Code's
provisions are relatively complex.
As with other similar statutes, the Code's substitute devise
protection does not apply to all devisees. This protection is only
provided for (1) devisees who come within the relational classification
of being a testator's grandparent or a lineal descendant of a
grandparent and (2) devisees who are stepchildren of the testator
or of the donor of a power of appointment exercised by the testator's
will.383 If a devisee is not a person who comes within the relational
umbrella or a stepchild, the common law rule of lapse applies and
there is no substitute devise. For example, descendants of devisees
who are uncovered relatives related by marriage or who are legal
strangers would not be protected by this provision. When testator's
spouse is a devisee, the spouse's descendants also are not protected
by the provision. This situation is to be compared to the case when
the spouse's child, a stepchild of testator, is the devisee. When the
stepchild is a devisee, the stepchild's descendants are protected by
the provision but if a devise is made to a surviving spouse and no
one else, the spouse's descendants, including a possible stepchild,
are not protected under the provision.
379. Id.
380. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-26-104 (Michie 1987).
381. Id.
382. U.P.C. §§ 2-603, 2-604 (1990) (amended 1993).
383. Id. § 2-603(b).
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If a devisee qualifies under the Code provision and the devise
lapses, a substitute devise is created for the devisee's surviving
descendants.38 4 Descendants who take the substitute devise share only
the interest the devisee would have taken if the devisee had survived
the testator and whatever they take, they take by representation. 5
Significantly, only the devisee's descendants receive this substituted
devise; other relatives of the devisee, such as spouses and collaterals,
are not accorded a substitute devise under the provision. Furthermore,
in order for the substitute descendants of deceased devisees to take
under the provision, they must survive the testator by 120 hours
although they need not survive the deceased devisee by any specific
length of time.38 6 If descendants of a qualified devisee fail to survive,
the common law rule of lapse applies and there is no substitute
devise.
The Code's antilapse provision is expansive in regard to the
timing of the lapse and to the types of devises covered. Its rules
apply to all types of devises including specific, general, demonstrative,
and residuary. It applies notwithstanding that the qualified devisee
died before the testator's will was executed or died between the
execution date and the testator's death.18 7 Beyond actual death of
a devisee, the provision applies in all circumstances where the devisee
is deemed under the Code to have predeceased the testator."' The
antilapse provision also specifically applies to descendants of devisees
of class gifts regardless of whether common law treats the devise
as lapsed or void. 89 Class gifts include, for example, devises to one's
children, siblings, cousins, and similar single generation relational
groups. Because of an inherent substitute devise effect, the Code's
provision does not apply to class devises such as devises to one's
issue, descendants, heirs, next of kin, and other multi-generational
relational groups.319
In a significant clarification of the law of lapse, the Code
specifically applies its substitute gift protection to the exercise of
powers of appointment. Under the Code, the exercise of a testamentary
power of appointment is a devise and an appointee of an exercised
testamentary power of appointment is a devisee. 39' Exercised
384. Id. § 2-603; see id. § 2-106.
385. Id. § 2-603(b)(1)(2); see id. § 2-106 (defining representation).
386. See id. § 2-702.
387. Id. § 2-603(a)(4)(ii).
388. See id. §§ 2-702, 2-801(d), 2-803, 2-804.
389. Id. § 2-603(b)(2).
390. Id.
391. Id. § 2-603(a)(3)-(4).
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testamentary powers are protected by the substitute gift presumption
if the appointee either comes within the class of being a grandparent
or a lineal descendant of a grandparent or is a stepchild of the
donor of a power of appointment exercised by the testator's will
or a stepchild of the testator who is donee of the power.3 92 For
example, if D devised or deeded property "to T for life, remainder
to G's children as T shall appoint," and T exercised the power in
favor of A but A predeceased T leaving surviving descendants, A's
surviving descendants would take a substitute devise if A is a member
of the covered relations of either D or T. It makes no difference
whether the power of appointment is a general or special power as
long as the appointee's relational threshold requirement is met. The
exercise may be to an individual or a class. If the substitute gift
presumption applies, it does not matter that the substitute taker is
not a member of the class of permissible appointees as long as the
appointee is a permissible appointee and meets the relational threshold
requirement.
Beyond the threshold determination of substantive relevance,
one is faced with a range of application problems that run from
simple to complex. The comment to section 2-603 contains excellent
illustrations explaining the operation of this provision. For one
interested in the complexity of lapse and its avoidance, perusal of
this comment is worthwhile.
If a devise lapses and the substitute devise provisions are
inapplicable, the Code has a special provision designating to whom
the lapsed devise passes 93 Significantly, regardless of who the devisee
is, the following rules apply to all lapsed devises. All lapsed devises
other than the residuary devise become part of the residue and pass
to the residuary devisees.39 When the residue is devised to two or
more devisees and one share fails for any reason, that devisee's
share, poasses to the othcr rcsidAuary devisee or devisees. 3 95 Thi' is a
meritorious rule of construction because it will frequently avoid part
of the estate passing in intestacy. Arkansas has a similar provision
for this situation. 3 96 Of course, if all the residue fails for any reason,
the residuary estate passes by intestacy to the testator's heirs.
As with all the Code's rules of construction, the provision does
not apply if the testator, by the terms of the will, indicates that
392. Id. § 2-603(b).
393. Id. § 2-604.
394. Id. § 2-604(a).
395. Id. § 2-604(b).
396. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-26-104(2) (Michie 1987).
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the provision does not apply. Section 2-603 sets the presumption
that mere statements of survivorship such as "if he survives me"
are not, "in the absence of additional evidence," sufficient indications
of an intent to override the statute's presumption. 97
In many lapse situations, no actual proof of intent will be
available and the court will be left with only the words of the will
to decipher. As mentioned, the Code's substitute devise presumably
applies unless a contrary intent is found. When a testator uses
survivorship words, however, a presumption stand-off arises: the
presumption of statutory application against an expression of contrary
intent. In such situations presumptions are frequently and properly
used, in a sense, to break the tie. The drafters correctly contend
that something has to be said to break the new tie and they opted
for testator's "express contrary intent" to rebut the statutory
presumption while testator's "mere words of survivorship" will not
rebut it.398
It is clear that if the testator adequately expresses an intent to
require survivorship, this expression will be given effect. The comment
to section 2-603 states that "foolproof" drafting techniques of
expressing a contrary intent include, for example, adding an additional
phrase to a devise that states "and not to [the devisee's] descendants"
or a separate clause that states "if the devisee of any non-residuary
devise does not survive me, the devise is to pass under the residuary
clause," or an addition to the residuary clause that states "including
all lapsed or failed devises."' 3 Where or how the line is to drawn
between "mere words of survivorship" and "express contrary intent"
is not explained.
The Code is complex because this is a complex issue when one
applies the rules to a variety of situations. Whether one agrees with
all the presumptions the Code sets or not, one has to agree that
the Code's attempt to resolve the primary issues that might arise is
meritorious. A properly drafted instrument will never be interpreted
under this provision.
E. Lapse and Will Substitutes
Many of the same issues may arise regarding the interpretation
of beneficiary designations in modern will substitutes, e.g., the
397. U.P.C. § 2-603(b)(3) (1990) (amended 1993). The justifications for this boil
down to two primary arguments. Id. § 2-603 cmt. First, the statute is said to be
remedial in that it favors family and thus deserves broad interpretation; second,
the issue has been litigated enough to have a firm rule. The comment notes the
conflict among the cases and cites several examples. Id.
398. Id. §§ 2-601, 2-603 cmt.
399. Id. § 2-603 cmt.
UALR LAW JOURNAL
unanticipated death or failure of a named beneficiary in a governing
instrument. The Code incorporates a provision that provides guidance
and stability to the interpretation of these beneficiary designations °.4
The Code applies the same substitute gift presumption to these
designations as it does to beneficiary designations in wills. 40 The
range of documents to which the provision applies is set out in the
Code's general definitions. It applies to beneficiary designations 4°2
included in all insurance and annuity policies, all POD accounts,
all TOD security registrations, all pension, profit-sharing, retirement
and other benefit plans, and all other nonprobate transfers that
occur at death. 403 The last reference is a catch-all reference that
makes the provision applicable to all nontestamentary gratuitous
transfers that arise at death and that are evidenced by a governing
instrument. On the other hand, it does not apply to persons who
hold interests in joint tenancy with right of survivorship or to parties
of multiple-party joint accounts held with right of survivorship. 4 4
This provision gives needed substance and predictability to the
many types of inter vivos documents that is lacking under current
law in most states. For example, if the beneficiary designation on
a life insurance policy reads: "to my spouse, but if my spouse does
not survive me, to my children," but the insured is survived only
by a child and a grandchild of another child that predeceased the
insured, this provision creates a substitute gift for the grandchild
and allows that person to share equally with the surviving child.
This result is clearly in accord with the intent of most insureds.
The substantive scope and application of the provisions are the
same as those matters related to lapse of devises in wills. The same
protected group, timing, and types of designation are employed. 4 5
Because of potential liability for third persons who rely on the
named designations, the Code protects third persons who pay proceeds
to, receive proceeds in payment for enforceable obligations from,
or purchase for value, assets from the beneficiary. °6 The beneficiary
and other gratuitous transferees are not protected and remain liable
for the proceeds received °"
400. Id. § 1-201(4).
401. See id. § 2-706.
402. Id. § 2-706(a)(2) & cmt.
403. Id. § 1-201(19).
404. Id. § 2-706(a)(2).
405. A perusal of the text discussing § 2-603 provides the reader with an ex-
planation of how this provision is to be applied and to operate. Id. § 2-706 cmt.
406. See id. § 2-706(d)-(e).
407. Id.
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Arkansas has no similar provision covering will substitutes. The
Code's extension of the antilapse presumption to will substitutes is
much needed for consistency and predictability.
F. Ademption and Nonademption by Extinction
The common law rule of construction regarding ademption by
extinction asserts that when a specifically devised item of property
is not identified as part of the testator's estate at the time of the
testator's death, the devise fails.408 Although this rule is merely a
rule of construction and is subject to control by the testator, many
courts severely limit the proof of the testator's intent by refusing
to admit extrinsic evidence of it. In these decisions, the testator's
intent to override the rule must be expressed on the face of the
will: the will must anticipate the problem and express a solution.
For example, T's will might read, "I devise my diamond ring to
A, but if I do not own a diamond ring at my death, I devise
$10,000 to A." Here, the testator has anticipated ademption by
extinction and if the ring is not in the estate, A would take the
$10,000 substitute devise. Unfortunately, most testators do not
anticipate ademption, and the common law rule precludes A from
taking anything from the estate for the devise unless the ring is
there, regardless of the testator's intent to the contrary.
Often, courts that follow the strict identity theory employ escape
devices to avoid forfeiture for a devisee when the court does not
believe the testator intended ademption. These devices include tracing
efforts to find the asset that testator holds at death which is traceable
to the asset described by the specific devise09 This works in situations
where the subject of the devise exists in testator's estate but it does
not exactly conform to the devise. For example, if T devised "my
1990 Chevrolet to A" but at death owns a 1992 Cadillac, A may
be able to take the Cadillac if a court is willing to trace the original
devise to the currently owned asset. Arkansas adheres to the general
rule that if the identical item is not in the estate, the gift is adeemed.4 0
Another related and sometimes overlapping escape device concerns
changes in form. The common law ademption rule did not cause
forfeiture if the specifically devised asset merely changed in form
and not in substance between the date of the will and the date of
408. ATKINSON, supra note 33, § 134.
409. See, e.g., In re Estate of Watkins, 284 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1973) (holding
that ademption not applied when securities change form due to merger or reor-
ganization of corporation).
410. Mee v. Cusineau, 213 Ark. 61, 209 S.W.2d 445 (1948).
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death. The asset as changed passes to the devisee. Depending on
the attitude of the court toward the particular devise in question,
this approach could often save a devise. For example, if T devised
"my 100 shares of XYZ common stock to A," and the corporation
converted the shares to preferred stock, A might successfully contend
that the 100 shares of common stock had only changed form and,
therefore, A should take the 100 preferred shares. Application of
this approach might depend on the degree of actual change and
whether the change was caused by voluntary or involuntary action
by the testator. Arkansas cases generally follow common law that
if the asset changes in form only, the gift is not adeemed. 41
Current Arkansas law touches only a small part of the issue
and its meaning is less than clear.41 2 The Code significantly alters
and clarifies the common law rule concerning ademption by extinction
of specific devises. 413 In a broad sense, the provision adopts a
nonademption rule subject to contravention by extrinsic evidence.
In other words, the provision reverses the presumption but makes
the presumption rebuttable by extrinsic evidence. In addition, the
provision provides specific remedies for several common ademption
problems..
First, the specific devisee has a right to specifically devised
property or any part of it that exists in testator's estate at death. 414
Concomitantly, the specific devisee has a right to assets that represent,
in part or in whole, the remaining interest which the testator retains
at death in the specifically devised property.4 15 The provision delineates
the following five situations as constituting a testator's remaining
interest at death: (1) the unpaid balance of the purchase price, plus
any accompanying security agreement, owed to the testator; (2) the
unpaid amount of a condemnation award owed to the testator; (3)
the unpaid fire or casualty insurance proceeds or recovery for injury
to the specifically devised property; (4) th, prnnperty received by
foreclosure or obtained in lieu of foreclosure on a specifically devised
obligation; and, (5) the real or personal property acquired by testator
as a replacement for the specifically devised property. 41 6 These rules
are not subject to contradiction by extrinsic evidence of testator's
unexpressed intent.
411. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 208 Ark. 478, 187 S.W.2d 163 (1945).
412. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-24-101 to -102 (Michie 1987).
413. U.P.C. § 2-606 (1990) (amended 1993).
414. Id. § 2-606(a).
415. Id. § 2-606(a)()-(5).
416. Id.
[Vol. 17:631
1995] ARKANSAS LAW AND UPC COMPARISON 703
Second, in contradiction to the common law rules on ademption
by extinction, the Code's "nonademption" provision reverses the
presumption of ademption and adopts a broad extrinsic evidence
rule to permit proof of testator's intent concerning ademption. If
the specifically devised property is not in the estate at the testator's
death, the devisee is presumptively entitled to a general pecuniary
devise equal to the value of the specifically devised property less
the value of any actual portion of the devise remaining in the estate
at the testator's death and of the five representative remaining
interests described above. 417 The presumption may be rebutted either
when the facts and circumstances indicate the testator intended
ademption or if ademption is consistent with the testator's manifested
plan of distribution.4 1 8 The latter proviso permits extrinsic evidence
to be admitted to determine T's intent and to permit the court to
consider the entire estate plan in order to determine what the testator
desired. A related concept that may be relevant to and coordinated
with this nonademption rule is the Code's provision concerning
abatement. 41
9
The third ademption by extinction problem for which the Code
provides a rule concerns transactions made for an incapacitated
testator by or with a lifetime conservator or agent under a durable
power of attorney. 420 The three specific situations covered by the
provision include when a conservator or agent (1) sells the specifically
devised property; (2) receives a condemnation award for the specifically
devised property; or (3) receives insurance proceeds for loss of the
property due to fire or casualty. 421 In all three situations, the specific
devisee is entitled to a general pecuniary devise equal to the net
sale price, condemnation award, or the value of the insurance
proceeds. 422 This right exists even when the conservator has already
received the amounts and has integrated these amounts 'into the
testator's other assets. These rules are not subject to contradiction
by extrinsic evidence of testator's unexpressed intent. If the testator
survives a judicial termination of testator's disability for one year
or more, however, the protection provided to the specific devisee
by this provision is no longer applicable. 423 Protecting the specific
devisee from conservator and agent transactions is consistent with
417. Id. § 2-606(a)(6).
418. Id.
419. Id. § 3-902(a).
420. Id. § 2-606(b)-(e).
421. Id. § 2-606(b).
422. Id.
423. Id. § 2-606(d).
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the concept that ademption or nonademption should be related to
the testator's intent. Acts of a third person, including a testator's
conservator or agent under a durable power, do not reveal the
testator's desires and should not materially and unfairly affect a
specific devisee's interest.
G. Accessions Regarding Devises of Securities
A substantial amount of the litigation concerning ademption by
extinction has dealt with devises of securities that, between the time
of the will's execution and the testator's death, have undergone
changes of form such as stock splits, reformulations or other
accessions. 424 Arkansas does not have a statute to deal with these
issues. The Code meritoriously provides answers to the common
issues raised by such devises. 425 The Code's provision concerns not
only devises of securities, which are broadly defined to include all
types of notes, stocks, bonds, and loans, but also mineral interest
agreements and leases as well as "any interest or instrument commonly
known as a security" and the right to purchase any of the above.
4 26
The threshold requirements of the provision are:
(1) The testator's will devised securities;
(2) At the time the will was executed, the testator owned
securities that meet the description of the devised securities;
(3) The additional securities owned by the testator at death
were acquired after the will was executed; and,
(4) The additional securities owned by the testator at death
were acquired as a result of the testator's ownership of the devised
securities. 427
It makes no difference whether the devise is characterized as specific
or general. 421
If these conditions are satisfied, the Udev sec, In addition to being.
entitled to as many of the shares of the devised security as are part
of the estate at the testator's death, is entitled to additional or other
securities in the following three situations: (1) the additional securities
of the same entity were issued by reason of action initiated by the
entity but not including securities acquired by the exercise of purchase
options; (2) securities of other entities are the result of a merger,
424. For a typical example, see Estate of Watkins, 284 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1973).
425. U.P.C. § 2-605 (1990) (amended 1993).
426. Id. § 1-201(43).
427. Id. § 2-605(a).
428. Id. § 2-605 cmt.
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consolidation, reorganization, or other similar action; or (3) securities
of the same entity are acquired as the result of reinvestment. 42 9
There are exclusions from the protective rule. Cash distributions
prior to death are not part of the devise. 430 This limitation means
that distributions such as cash dividends declared prior to death,
although not paid until after death, are not part of the specific
devise. 43' The provision also does not apply to nonsecurity devises
that may be subject to accessions. The comment states that the
section is not intended to be exclusive as to accessions affecting
securities and assumably it would not preclude similar accession
interpretations in regard to other nonsecurity devises that raise similar
problems .432
H. Ademption by Satisfaction
The ademption by satisfaction doctrine is the testamentary
counterpart of the advancement doctrine under intestate succession.
This common law doctrine provides that a general or residuary devise
is adeemed, in whole or in part, when a testator makes an inter
vivos gift to the devisee after the execution of the will. 433 As with
advancements, the purpose of the doctrine is to prevent a devisee
from receiving a double share.434 Although its application in any
situation depends on proof of the testator's intent, that intent is
difficult to judicially establish. When intent is not clearly manifested,
courts use presumptions to settle the issue. Under some circumstances
a gift might be presumed to be satisfaction; under another situation,
it might be presumed to be an unencumbered gift. Unfortunately,
the presumptions have not been applied with any significant degree
of consistency.
Arkansas has no specific provision concerning ademption by
satisfaction. The Code codifies the common law ademption by
satisfaction doctrine and formalizes its proof requirements. 4"
Paralleling its provision concerning advancements, the Code provides
that a gift is satisfaction of a devise only if one of several formalities
is satisfied.43 6 A gift is a formal satisfaction if either (1) the will
429. Id. § 2-605(a)(1)-(3).
430. Id. § 2-605(b).
431. Id. § 2-605 cmt.
432. Id.
433. ATKINSON, supra note 33, § 133.
434. ATKINSON, supra note 33, § 133.
435. U.P.C. § 2-609 (1990) (amended 1993).
436. Id. § 2-609(a).
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provides for the deduction, (2) the testator declared so "in a
contemporaneous writing," or (3) the devisee "acknowledged in
writing" that the gift is in satisfaction of the devise. 4 7 The required
writing may, rather than declaring the gift is in satisfaction, merely
indicate that the gift is to be deducted from the value of the devise. 4
3
No words of art such as "satisfaction" need to be used by the
testator. The gist of the declaration must indicate that the testator
intended the gift to constitute what lawyers call a gift in satisfaction
of a devise. It is also not specifically required that the written
expression of intent to make a formal satisfaction be communicated
to the devisee at the time of the gift.439 A qualified formality could
be a contemporaneous written note or indication that the gift is a
formal satisfaction that is included with the testator's personal records.
The writing must be available or provable after the testator's death
when distribution decisions are made. It cannot be a blanket written
statement that attempts to categorize future gifts as satisfaction."0
Several other features of the Code's provision deserve mention.
There is no requirement that the gift must be made to the devisee:
if the formality is satisfied and the necessary intent is declared, a
gift to someone other than the devisee will be satisfaction of the
devise. 441 Although required by common law, the Code does not
require that the relevant actions take place in a certain chronology.
Formal satisfaction might be accomplished before the will is executed,
although most cases will concern the reverse chronology. The comment
states that formal satisfaction need not necessarily be an outright
gift. 4 2 Other will substitutes, such as life insurance payable to the
devisee, may constitute a satisfaction under the Code. 443
The Code specifically provides that where a devisee of a formal
satisfaction fails to survive the donor, the formal satisfaction affects
the share that the devisee's descendants take from testator's estate
if the descendants take as substitute devisees under the Code's
antilapse provisions, unless the testator's contemporaneous writing
expressly provides that the gift is not to affect the descendants'
devise.4" This is the opposite rule from the Code's advancement
provision. The distinction is justifiable on the basis that satisfaction
437. Id.
438. Id. § 2-609 cmt.
439. Id.
440. Estate of McFayden v. Sample, 454 N.W.2d 676 (Neb. 1990).
441. U.P.C. § 2-609 cmt. (1990) (amended 1993).
442. Id.
443. Id. § 2-609 cmt.
444. Id. § 2-609(c); see id. §§ 2-603, -604.
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concerns the testator's intent whereas advancement concerns intestacy
and therefore legislative intent. The gift in satisfaction does not
affect the devisee's descendants if they take as alternative devisees
unless the testator's contemporaneous writing expressly provides that
the gift affects that descendants' devise." 5
Valuation of formal satisfaction is determined as of the time
of the devisee's possession or enjoyment or as of the testator's death,
whichever occurs first." 6
I. Right of Nonexoneration
At present, Arkansas follows the common law rule of
exoneration. 447 The specific devisee can force the personal
representative to pay off any "secured debt" out of general assets
of the estate (the "residue")." 8 Significantly, the Arkansas section
applies in intestate situations to exonerate the homestead passing to
the widow, and thus serves an important policy function of providing
for the widow. The latter problem cannot occur under the Code
succession pattern which assures the surviving spouse of all or a
major share of the estate." 9 Under the Arkansas statute, it is hard
to determine when a testator has "provided otherwise" by his or
her will. If the specific devise is of "all of my right, title and
interest in the following real property," has the testator indicated
an intent to devise only the equity subject to outstanding mortgages?
Under the Code, the common law rule of right of exoneration
of a mortgage on specifically devised real and personal property is
abolished regardless of a general directive in the will to pay debts. 40
Consequently, property specifically devised is distributed subject to
any mortgage interest attached to it that exists at the testator's death.
Which rule is preferred depends on what one believes the average
testator would desire. The nonexoneration rule of the Code is an
easier rule to administer simply because the creditor on long-term
obligations like mortgages usually relies on his security interest rather
than the personal obligation of the decedent.
J. Powers of Appointment
Despite their importance to estate planning practices, legislation
generally ignores powers of appointment and the legal issues related
445. Id.
446. Id. § 2-609(c).
447. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-53-105, -113 (Michie 1987).
448. Id. § 28-53-113.
449. U.P.C. § 2-102 (1990) (amended 1993).
450. Id. § 2-607.
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to them. Arkansas has joined in this neglect. The Code, in a series
of scattered provisions, addresses some of the more important
matters .
451
There are several types of powers that are relevant to the Code's
provisions. 4 2 First, a general power is defined as a power that permits
the donee to appoint the property to the donee personally, to the
donee's creditors, to the donee's estate, or to creditors of the donee's
estate. 4 3 If a power contains no restriction on whom may be an
appointee, it is presumed the power is a general power.4 54 Second,
a nongeneral power, or what is sometimes called a special power,
is unhelpfully defined by the Restatement as any power that is not
a general power.4 55 Usually the donee of a nongeneral power is
permitted to appoint only to a particular group of persons, such as
one's children or descendants. Because of federal gift and estate tax
benefits, nongeneral powers may include as objects everyone except
the donee, the donee's creditors, the donee's estate, and the creditors
of the donee's estate.
Powers are also categorized as to when they may be exercised. 456
A power of appointment is presently exercisable if the donee may
immediately exercise it at the time in question.45 7 It is stated that
the donee may exercise it by deed.458 A "deed" is merely any legally
operative act or instrument effective during the donee's lifetime. A
power of appointment is not presently exercisable if it may only be
exercised by a will (testamentary power) or at the time in question
451. A power of appointment is the "authority, other than as an incident of
the beneficial ownership of property, to designate recipients of beneficial interest
in property." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 11.1 (1986). There are five
principal persons who are inherently involved in a power: (1) the donor, who is
the creator of the power; (2) the donee, who is the person who holds the power;
(3) the objects, who are the persons for whom an appointment can be exercised;
(4) the appointees, who are the persons for whom the powers have been exercised;
and, (5) the takers in default, who are the persons who will take the property to
the extent that the power is not exercised. Id. § 11.2. Persons may function in
more than one category. In addition, a power is personal to the donee and may
not be exercised by other persons. If a donee does not exercise the power, it
expires. Two property interests need identification: (1) the appointive assets which
compose the assets subject to the exercise of the power; and, (2) the donee's
personal beneficial interest in the appointive assets other than as an object of the
power. Id. § 11.3.
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cannot be exercised until some event or passage of time occurs.459
All powers must be in existence before they are exercisable.4 A
power of appointment created in a living person's will does not
come into existence until that person dies and the will becomes
effective.4 61
Two other characterizations are also relevant.462 The donee may
hold a purely collateral power if the donee holds no interest in the
property except the power. 463 On the other hand, the donee may
hold a power in gross if the donee holds both an interest in the
property and a power that, if exercised, would dispose of the interest
that the donee does not hold.46
1. Exercise Of Power Of Appointment
When a testator holds a testamentary powers of appointment
at death, it becomes essential to determine whether the testator, as
donee of the power, has exercised it in the will. Most often the
instrument that creates the special or general power of appointment
specifically names a taker or takers in default of the appointment
by the donee. Occasionally, the power does not name takers in
default and if a general power is not exercised by the donee, the
property reverts to the donor's estate for distribution according to
the distribution pattern determined for that estate. The Code includes
rules of construction to resolve these issues when a testator's intent
is not clearly expressed.
There are several situations that must be distinguished. The
following three factors guide the application of the rules of
construction adopted in the Code: (1) whether the governing instrument
that created the power of appointment expressly requires that a
power is exercised by the will only if the donee makes a reference
to the power or its source in the will; (2) whether the power of
appointment is a general or a nongeneral power; and (3) whether
the testator-donee's will expresses an intention to exercise the power
of appointment.
a. No Specific Reference Requirement
If the document creating a power of appointment is nonexplicit
in that it does not include a requirement that the power may only
459. Id.
460. Id. § 11.5, cmt. a.
461. Id.




be exercised "by a reference, or by an express or specific reference"
to the power in the exercising document, a will that contains a
"general residuary clause" or that makes a "general disposition of
all the testator's property," exercises the power only if one of two
conditions are met.45 First, a will containing a general residuary
clause or a comparable clause exercises a general testamentary
nonexplicit power if the document creating the power fails to contain
an effective gift in default of exercise.4" This rule permits the donee's
will to control the disposition of the property subject to the power
rather than allowing the takers of the donor's estate to take. A
contrary rule can create unintended and unanticipated results, including
the need to reopen a donor's closed estate and to cause estate tax
consequences to an otherwise settled estate. Second, any general and
nongeneral nonexplicit testamentary power is exercised if the testator's
will. manifests an intention to include the property that is subject
to the power as part of the residuary or general disposition clause. 467
These rules prevent unintended exercises of powers from occurring
merely because a residue clause is included in a donee's will but
provide a broad exception if admissible evidence indicates that the
testator desired to exercise the power. The distinction between
interpretations can be illustrated by comparing its application to two
typical drafting examples: (1) if the residuary clause in the testators's
will merely devises "all the rest, residue and remainder" of the
estate, presumably the power is not exercised; but (2) if the residuary
clause in the testators's will devises "all the rest, residue and remainder,
including any property over which a power of appointment is held,"
presumably the power is exercised.4" The latter is called a "blending"
or "blanket" clause." 9 The inclusion of such a clause in a will raises
a presumption under the Code that the testator intended to exercise
a power if that power does not require a particular reference to it
to be exercised. 470 When the residuary clause omits the reference to
powers of appointment, the presumption is that testator does not
intend to exercise a power. Either presumption is subject to rebuttal
with extrinsic evidence under the principle of section 2-601 .47
465. U.P.C. § 2-608 (1990) (amended 1993).
466. Id.
467. Id. § 2-608.
468. Id. § 2-608 cmt.
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Id. § 2-608 cmt.
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b. Specific Reference Requirement
If the document creating a power of appointment is explicit in
that it includes a requirement that the power may only be exercised
"by a reference, an express reference or a specific reference" to
the power in the exercising document, the language is presumed to
indicate the donor did not desire inadvertent exercise of the power.172
This presumption relates to the exercise of all explicit powers whether
they are general or nongeneral and to all exercising documents
whether they are wills or will substitutes. The exact meaning of this
provision is not clear on its face. The comment to the section explains
that the section creates a mere presumption against an exercise that
prevents, for example, a blending clause from automatically exercising
the power as such a clause would do when the power is nonexplicit.47 3
Beyond the mere presumption, the questions of the donor's intent
as to the requirements for exercise and the donee's intent as to the
exercise of the power are left to extrinsic evidence.474 Relevant extrinsic
evidence may swing the determination either way: in one direction
it may show that the donee intended exercise although the donee
did not make an otherwise sufficient reference to the power or, in
the other direction, it may show that the donor desired a specific
reference to the power and any reference that fails to satisfy this
requirement fails to exercise the power. The provision has the apparent
purpose of both preventing inadvertent exercise but leaving open
the question of proof of intent by inferentially relying on extrinsic
evidence to supply that intent.
2. Virtual Representation And General Powers Of
Appointment
The Code gives special treatment to the acts of, and to formal
court orders binding, the sole holder or all co-holders of a presently
exercisable general power of appointment.4 75 A general power is
described as any power of appointment in which the holder of the
power is capable of drawing absolute ownership to the holder
personally.476 Although a "holder" of such a power is commonly
a donee of a general power of appointment created by the donor,
the term is also applicable to the settlor or beneficiary of a trust
472. Id. § 2-704.
473. Id. § 2-704 cmt.
474. See id. § 2-701.
475. Id. §§ 1-108, 1-403(2)(i).
476. Id. § 1-108 cmt.
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in which the settlor or beneficiary retains a power to revoke the
trust.
A holder or the unanimous co-holders of a presently exercisable
general power of appointment can, by granting consent or approval,
relieve personal representatives or trustees from a liability or a penalty
which these fiduciaries would ordinarily suffer due to a failure to
perform a particular duty required by the Code or other law. 477
Similarly, the holder or unanimous co-holders of a general power
may consent "to modification or termination of a trust or to deviation
from its terms. ' 47 The effect of approval or consent of the holder
or unanimous co-holders of a general power is to bind the beneficiaries
to the extent that the beneficiaries' interests are subject to the power
notwithstanding that no court order is obtained. This virtual
representation capability can be of crucial significance in nonjudicial
settlements of estates and trusts where consent of all interested parties
is essential to effectuate the settlement.
The Code also provides that orders resulting from formal court
proceedings which bind a holder or all co-holders of such a general
power bind other persons to the extent that these persons' interests
are subject to the power. 47 9 This provision has the effect of eliminating
the ordinary requirements for notice to and jurisdiction over numerous
and unknown and sometimes unborn, beneficiaries when litigation
occurs. 48 0 It would not apply, however, if the validity of the general
power itself is the issue involved because the power holder or holders
cannot represent the others in this type of litigation. 41 The justification
for this ability to bind others is that the holders of presently exercisable
general powers of appointment possess the equivalent of full
ownership. Furthermore, the financial interests between the holder
of the power and those persons who have interests subject to the
power are sufficiently compatible to satisfy fairness and due process
concerns. The virtual representation power of holders of presently
exercisable general powers of appointment does not apply under the
Code to holders of nongeneral powers such as special powers and
general testamentary powers.
IX. ADDITIONAL SCOPE OF THE CODE
Article II of the Code covers a wide range of subjects not
generally covered by statutory law. The meritorious purpose of the
Code's provisions is to give definiteness to the law.
477. Id. § 1-108.
478. Id.
479. Id. § 1-403(2)(i).
480. Id. § 1-403(2)(iii).
481. Id. § 1-403 cmt.
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Code provisions cover issues concerning the following matters:
A. Survivorship Duration Determinations
The Code adopts the rule that a beneficiary under any governing
instrument must survive the date and time of the relevant event that
determines ownership by 120 hours.412 This provision applies to a
wide range of transfer devices including wills, life insurance policies,
multiple-party accounts, transfer on death (TOD) security registrations,
and other joint ownership with right of survivorship interests. 43
Persons who claim that a beneficiary survived by 120 hours must
prove so by clear and convincing evidence. 484
The 120-hour rule for all gratuitous transfer documents including
wills, deeds, trusts, appointments, and other beneficiary designations
tracks the same rule that is applicable in the intestate situation. 485
The difference between these concepts is that in regard to intestacy,
the requirement is a rule of law and is not rebuttable whereas the
rule applicable to voluntary transfers is alterable by the terms of
the document. 48 6 The Code is very specific, however, in regards to
what is necessary to rebut the statutory rule of construction.4 7 The
Code itemizes four general situations where the statutory rule of
construction will not apply. First, it will not apply if the governing
instrument contains language that deals explicitly with simultaneous
death or with deaths in a common disaster and that language is
operable under the facts of the case.48 Second, the rule of construction
is rebutted if the governing instrument expressly indicates that the
beneficiary is not required to survive to a particular time or event
by any specific length of time or that expressly requires the individual
to survive an event or time by a specific period. 489 The specific
period in the above exception includes a reference to the death of
another individual. Third, the rule of construction does not apply
if application of the rule would cause the transfer to fail to qualify
as a valid transfer under the Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities. 490
The fourth rebuttal for the rule of construction applies in the situation
where the rule would result in an unintended failure or unintended
482. Id. § 2-702.
483. See id. § 1-202(19).
484. Id. § 2-702.
485. See id. § 2-104.
486. Id. § 2-702(d).
487. Id.
488. Id. § 2-702(d)(1).
489. Id. § 2-702(d)(2).
490. See id. § 2-702(d)(3).
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duplication of a disposition.49' Notwithstanding the waiver of the
120-hour survivorship requirement, survival of an event or time must
be established by clear and convincing evidence.4 92
Third parties dealing with transferees and bona fide purchasers
from transferees, who subsequently fail to survive the necessary
period of time, are protected under the Code.
493
B. Constructional Rules for Future Interests
The trust device is a common estate planning tool. Inherent in
the trust is the future interest. The typical trust is established for
the term of one or more persons' lives with the undistributed corpus
to be transferred free of the trust to the remainder beneficiaries or
to the settlor or the settlor's estate as a reversion. Although life
interests, remainder interests, and reversions are present interests,
they are called future interests if they are not also presently possessory
or currently enjoyed. 494 Other interests similarly characterized include
executory interests, possibilities of reverter, and rights of entry. Any
of these interests may have problems of construction at the time
the interest becomes possessory or ready for present enjoyment, i.e.,
identifying the particular beneficiaries who will take. As with most
matters of construction, the expressed desires of the transferor will
be followed if determinable. Unfortunately, the intent is often not
expressed, inadequately expressed, or inapplicable because of changed
circumstances. It then is necessary to fill the intent gap with rules
of construction. Generally, these rules should conform to the desires
of the average transferor. The common law developed rules of
construction for these circumstances, but they are often inconsistently
applied and produce results that many would contend were not
consistent with the desires of the average transferor.
The Code, recognizing the importance of future interest in
modern e-state plannig, addresses the major constructional problems
that arise when expressed intent is absent or unclear and distribution
decisions must be made.
1. Survivorship
The survivorship of the life interests is not a problem. If one
is not alive or does not survive the creation of the trust or the
491. Id. § 2-702(d)(4).
492. Id. § 2-702(d)(2)-(4).
493. Id. § 2-702(e)-(f).
494. LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER, ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS IN A
NUTSHELL § 1.2 (1993).
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interest in trust, the life beneficiary does not take from the trust.
Survivorship is most often a problem of the remainder beneficiaries
because their interests do not mature in possession or enjoyment
until the death of the holders of the life interests. The question of
survivorship arises after the death of the transferor or the date of
creation of the trust when the life interest or interests end. Must
the remainder beneficiaries survive the time of distribution or merely
the time of creation? Courts have had numerous problems with this
question.
If the transferor clearly indicates that survivorship to the date
of distribution is or is not required, the expressed intent will be
obeyed. The problem arises when intent is not clearly expressed.
What is the default rule? The general common law rule holds that
survivorship to date of distribution is not presumed: that is, if the
remainder beneficiary died between the date of creation and date
of distribution, the interest passes to the beneficiary's estate for
distribution according to the beneficiary's will or by intestacy if
there is no will. This construction requires reopening of estates and
the consequent complexities. As a result, courts sometimes strain to
avoid application of the general rule but have not developed a
consistent response to the problem.
The Code adopts a new rule of construction concerning the
survivorship requirement for future interests in trust.495 It reverses
the presumption and provides that there is an implied requirement
of survivorship to the date of distribution for future interests held
in trust.496 In addition, the survivorship requirement is extended to
120 hours after the time of distribution. 497 For example, under the
Code's provision, if a simple trust provides "to T in trust for A
for life, remainder to B," B must survive A's death, the date of
distribution, by 120 hours in order for B to take the remainder
interest.
The new presumption is only applicable to future interests in
trust and therefore does not apply to nonequitable interests such as
"to A for life, remainder to B."1498 The common law rule would
continue to apply in those cases. Despite the limitation, the new
rule will apply to most future interests created today because of the
dominance of the trust device as an estate planning tool. One of
the arguments for the nonsurvivorship rule is the desire to permit
495. U.P.C. § 2-707 (1990) (amended 1993).
496. Id. § 2-707(b).
497. Id. § 2-702.
498. Id. § 2-707 cmt.
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free alienation of property as soon as possible. 499 If persons who
hold remainders do not have to survive anyone to take, the interest
is more readily transferrable in comparison with a contingent remainder
dependent on survivorship to an unknown date. Survivorship
contingencies in regard to trust interests are not barriers to property
transfers because the trustee may transfer the property of the trust
during its administration.
If beneficiaries fail to survive the date of distribution and the
antilapse presumption is unavailable, the Code specifies how the
lapse will be treated. °° If there is a residual devise in the transferor's
will, the trust corpus passes to those beneficiaries.5 0 If no residue
exists or the residue is in trust and its remainder beneficiaries fail
to survive the date of distribution, the trust corpus passes in
intestacy. 0 2 For future interests created by the exercise of a power
of appointment, the lapsed property interest passes to the donor's
takers in the default clause, if any, which is treated as creating a
future interest in trust.5 3 If there are still no takers, then the lapsed
interest passes as an ordinary future interest, except the transferor
means the donor of a nongeneral power and the donee of a general
power. o4
2. Antilapse
The presumption that survivorship is necessary may.cause interests
to fail and if the nonsurviving beneficiary cannot take, might cut
off the beneficiary's stock. The problem of forfeiture served in part
as the reasoning behind the common law presumption against a
survivorship requirement. °50 Unfortunately, the common law remedy
of passing the remainder interest through the nonsurviving beneficiary's
estate did not depend upon the existence of descendants surviving
the beneficiary. The Code resolves the forfeiture problem by providing
an "antiapse" presumption in favor of a nonsurviving beneficiary's
descendants.
The Code provides that if a remainder beneficiary fails to survive
the date of distribution, a substitute gift arises for the beneficiary's
descendants, if any survive.2 6 This is an "antilapse" rule for future
499. Id.
500. Id. § 2-707(d).
501. Id. § 2-707(d)(1).
502. Id. § 2-702(d)(2).
503. Id. § 2-707(e)(1).
504. Id. § 2-707(e)(2).
505. Id. § 2-707 cmt.
506. Id. § 2-707.
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interests in trust. 07 It protects descendants of all remainder
beneficiaries, regardless of their relationship to the transferor. One
does not have to be a grandparent or descendant of a grandparent
to be entitled to the presumption of the substitute gift. It applies
to remainders to specific individuals and to remainders left to classes
of persons who are all in a single generation. 08 Examples of single
generation class gifts include gifts to "children," "grandchildren,"
"siblings," and "nephews and nieces." 509 It does not apply to multiple-
generation class gifts that inherently possess a nonlapsing effect
because representation is allowed for descendants of predeceased
ancestors in the class. °10 Examples of such class gifts include gifts
to "descendants," "issue," "heirs," and "next of kin." '' In a
sense, the Code converts all single generation class gifts in remainder
to multiple generation gifts in remainder. It applies both to irrevocable
inter vivos trusts and to trusts that are created at death.
The antilapse protection is merely a rule of construction subject
to revision by the transferor. Similar to the rule as applied to
decedent's estates, a mere survivorship requirement in the instrument
will not rebut the presumption." 2 The common law rule of lapse
and the Code's modification to it are discussed previously.' t 3
3. Worthier Title
In an effort to clarify an otherwise confused and varied area
of the law of future interests, both Arkansas law and the Code
abolish the worthier title doctrine.1 14 The Code's version is simplified
and removes the ancient conveyancing language. It states that transfers
which pass interests to the transferor's "heirs," "heirs at law,"
"next of kin," "relatives," "family," and analogous terms do not
create, by law or presumption, a reversionary interest in the
transferor. 515 The common law rule is that a remainder is created.
Fundamentally, the abolition merely means the transferor's intent
must be determined without the assistance of the worthier title
507. See id. § 2-603.




512. Id. § 2-707(b)(3).
513. Id. §§ 2-603, 2-604.
514. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-220 (Michie 1987); U.P.C. § 2-710 (1990) (amended
1993).
515. See U.P.C. § 2-710 (1990) (amended 1993).
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presumption or rule. Assumably, when specific intent is not indicated,
intent may be established by extrinsic evidence. 16
4. Definition of "Heirs"
The Code provides a rule of construction for terms such as
"heirs," "heirs at law," "next of kin," "relatives," ''family," or
analogous terms used in applicable statutes or any governing
instruments." 7 It applies to both present and future interests." 8 The
Code simply and properly provides that these terms, when used in
relation to a designated individual, pass the interests covered by the
transfer to those who would take the designated individual's property
according to the intestate succession law of the designated individual's
domicile. The date to determine this distrib~ition is the time when
the disposition takes effect in possession or enjoyment. If applicable
under the law of the domicile, the state may take by escheat if
other relations cannot take. One specific exception in the provision
bars a surviving spouse of a designated individual from being an
heir if the surviving spouse is remarried at the time of distribution. 19
C. Disclaimer of Property Interests
Both Arkansas law and the Code include provisions concerned
with the disclaiming of property interests. 20 The doctrine of disclaimer
continues to be an important post-mortem planning device. Although
the basic doctrine is probably universally recognized, unnecessary
limitations and uncertainties have developed. The Arkansas and Code
provisions seek to correct these deficiencies by codifying the scope
and effect of the doctrine as it applies to matters related to probate,
succession and all other relevant nontestamentary transfers and
contracts.
With a few modifications and some restructuring, the Code is
substantially identical in effect to the current Arkansas provisions.:2
D. Termination of Marital Status
A person's marital status is very important in determining many
rights and responsibilities set by the Code. These rights and
516. Id. § 2-701.
517. Id. § 2-711; see id. § 1-201(21).
518. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 29.4 cmts. c and g (1986).
519. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-1-102 (Michie 1987).
520. Id. §§ 28-2-101 to -109; U.P.C. § 2-801 (1990) (amended 1993).
521. AVERILL, supra note 5, at 228-33.
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responsibilities include, for example, distribution in intestacy, elective
share rights, revocation of wills, family protection rights, priority
for appointment as personal representative, and appointment of a
guardian for an incapacitated person. 22 Although the Code leaves
the requirements for marriage to the law of domestic relations, it
includes provisions setting the scope and effect of legal proceedings
and other actions which sever the relationship. This issue is not
directly addressed under Arkansas law.
Under the Code, a person is not a surviving spouse of the
decedent if the person and the decedent have been divorced or their
marriage annulled . 23 This rule does not apply, of course, if they
remarry and are married on the date of the decedent's death . 24 It
also does not apply to a decree of separation that does not terminate
the husband-wife status . 25 Notwithstanding the absence of a final
divorce or annulment, unless a contrary intent appears on the
agreement, a complete property settlement entered into after or in
anticipation of separation or divorce operates as a disclaimer of the
spouse's elective share, family protections, rights under intestate
succession, and provisions in wills executed before the property
settlement. 526
In addition to a spouse who has obtained a valid divorce or
an annulment, the term "surviving spouse" also does not include:
(1) a person who obtained or consented to a final decree of divorce
or annulment even though the decree is not valid in the Code state,
unless that person has subsequently remarried the decedent or
subsequently lived together as husband and wife;5 27 (2) a person who
participated in a marriage ceremony with a third person following
a valid or invalid decree of divorce or annulment; 21 or (3) a person
who participated as a party to a valid proceeding which terminated
all marital property rights.5 29 The above three situations recognize
a kind of estoppel concept. In each one the surviving person has
either consented, participated in, sought or completed some volitional
act other than the "divorce" that causes the marital relationship to
be terminated as far as the surviving spouse's rights under the Code
are concerned. Because the rights of a surviving spouse under the
522. See U.P.C. § 2-802(b) (1990) (amended 1993).
523. Id. § 2-802(a).
524. Id.
525. Id.
526. Id. § 2-213.
527. Id. § 2-802(b)(1).
528. Id. § 2-802(b)(2).
529. Id. § 2-802(b)(3).
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Code are substantial, it is very important that only those who legally
and equitably should be considered a surviving spouse are able to
take these benefits.
E. Effect of Homicide
Generally, a person's misconduct does not disqualify the person
from inheriting property or from taking property passing from other
persons.5 30 Consequently, for example, desertion, conviction of a
felony, or adultery will not cause a forfeiture of the wrongdoer's
property or rights to property passing from those harmed. There
are exceptions. Under the Code, for example, a parent and the
kindred of that parent, who fails to support a child while legally
obligated to support, may be barred in intestacy from inheriting
from the nonmarital child or the child's descendants. 531
The most pervasive exception to the general rule concerns statutes
or court decisions that bar murderers from inheriting or taking
property from their victims. The rationale for this rule is to prohibit
a wrongdoer from profiting from the wrongful act done to the
victim. The substantive and procedural rules for this forfeiture greatly
differ among the states which recognize it. In addition, substantial
omissions in the rules commonly occur. For example, it is common
for a state to bar a murderer from taking in intestacy, testacy, and
from receiving life insurance proceeds on the victim's life, but to
ignore other forms of property transfers. Sometimes court's have
filled in some of the gaps, but many unanswered issues continue to
exist.
The only Arkansas statutory provision addressing the right of
a murderer to succeed to property deals with dower. 3 2 Arkansas
courts, however, have followed common law in denying murderers
the right to profit from their wrongs. 33 The lack of a comprehensive
statute governing initneta.te.. uccess;.,--.., and nonprobate
transfers, as well as the uncertainties of proof requirements, has led
to litigation over the issues. 34
For the sake of clarity and uniformity, the Code includes a
substantively and procedurally comprehensive provision concerning
530. ATKINSON, supra note 33, § 31.
531. See U.P.C. § 2-114(c) (1990) (amended 1993).
532. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-11-204 (Michie 1987).
533. See, e.g., Sargent v. Benton State Bank, 279 Ark. 402, 652 S.W.2d 10
(1983).
534. See Wright v. Wright, 248 Ark. 105, 449 S.W.2d 952 (1990); Luecke v.
Mercantile Bank, 286 Ark. 304, 691 S.W.2d 843 (1985).
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the effect of homicide on the rights of murderers to take property
from, or assume other privileges granted by, their victims. 35 Arkansas's
statutes ignore the problem except with regard to the inheritance
rights of persons who murder their spouse. In general, the Code
prohibits a person who feloniously and intentionally kills another
from accepting any benefits derived from the victim. The Code deals
specifically with statutory benefits conferred as a result of death,
benefits conferred in all the decedent's revocable governing
instruments, and rights of survivorship in jointly held or community
property. 3 6 The Code also includes a catch-all clause providing that
the same principles are to be applied to the murderer's acquisition
of any property or interest from the victim. 37 In addition to forfeiture
of property interests, the Code revokes nominations of the murderer
in governing instruments to serve in fiduciary or representative
capacities such as personal representative, trustee, or agent.
F. Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities
The common law rule against perpetuities has perplexed students,
professors, lawyers, and judges for centuries. 38 Although the rule
against perpetuities is easy to state, its complexity developed from
difficulties in its application. A common formulation of the Rule
provides: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not
later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation
of the interest." 53 9 The Arkansas Supreme Court follows the common
law rule.140 The chief purposes of the common law approach are
stated to be a desire to curtail the deadhand control of wealth and
to facilitate the marketability of property. 41 Few would question its
goals, but many have criticized its methods. Several facets of the
application of the rule against perpetuities engender the criticisms.
First, the rule against peripetuities is really not a rule concerned
with the duration of an interest but is concerned with a technical
535. U.P.C. § 2-803 (1990) (amended 1993).
536. Id. § 2-803(b)-(c).
537. Id. § 2-803(f).
538. Justice George Rose Smith of the Arkansas Supreme Court commiserated:
"The complications that may be presented by the rule against perpetuities are so
numerous and difficult that even experienced lawyers and judges must usually
consult the authorities to be certain about its application to a given set of facts."
Dickerson v. Union Nat'l Bank, 268 Ark. 292, 296, 595 S.W.2d 677, 679-80 (1980).
539. JOHN C. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201, at 191 (4th ed.
1942).
540. See, e.g., Cotham v. First Nat'l Bank, 287 Ark. 167, 697 S.W.2d 101
(1985).
541. ROBERT J. LYNN, THE MODERN RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 9-10 (1966).
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property concept of the vesting of an interest. Comparatively speaking,
a relatively short twenty-five year suspended interest could violate
the rule against perpetuities for failure to vest within its confines
whereas a suspended interest tested against lives in being could be
valid under the rule against perpetuities even though it actually will
last for ninety years or more. This inconsistency in application
justifies criticism.
Second, the rule against perpetuities is enforced with psychic
anticipation of contingencies coupled with a draconian "all or nothing"
remedy if the contingencies violate the rule against perpetuities.
According to common law, an interest created in a governing
instrument, whether a will or other transfer device, had to be tested
against the rule against perpetuities at its creation. All contingencies
in the interest created are tested to see whether they will become
vested within the term of the rule against perpetuities. There must
be an initial certainty of vesting of all of the interests. If an interest
is not certain of vesting within the rule against perpetuities, the
concept of infective invalidity might cause the entire transfer to fail.
Commentators belabor these points in emphasizing the inconsistency,
nonsensical approach, draconian remedy, and unjust result by
application of the rule against perpetuities.
The following is but a brief outline of the relevant concepts
promoted by the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities
(USRAP) as well as a brief description of its provisions. The purposes
of the USRAP are broad. Obviously, as part of the Uniform Probate
Code and as a separate uniform act, it is designed to bring uniformity
of the law to the various states in this country. In addition,
promulgation of the provisions reaffirms that there is a need for a
rule against perpetuities. Abolition of the common law rule against
perpetuities was rejected. Another important factor and feature of
the provisions is that transfer language in instruments effective prir
to enactment of the USRAP continues to be valid after enactment.
The USRAP does not enlarge the range of invalidity. It is designed
to recognize devices currently valid and to expand the scope of
validity to other drafting techniques. Consequently, those who are
well versed in the old law will not have to learn new law in order
to qualify their transfer techniques.
The core of the USRAP is found in its definition of the period
of time within which a non-vested interest must vest in order to be
valid. Phrased in the disjunctive, a non-vested interest is valid if it
is certain to vest or terminate either no later than twenty-one years
after the death of a living individual or within ninety years after
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its creation.5 42 The first arm of the rule is merely a codification of
the common law rule. The second arm is a form of a wait and see
approach tied to a specific length of time. The combination of these
two alternate standards can be summarized as follows:
(1) A transfer which is valid under the common law Rule is
valid under the USRAP's provision and no modification is necessary
to forms or instruments that satisfy this standard;5 43
(2) Notwithstanding validity under the common law Rule, no
interest is contestable as to validity until ninety years have passed
from its creation; 5'"
(3) The common "savings" clause which specifically terminates
an interest within the common law rule will also qualify under
this provision.
A primary purpose of USRAP is to reduce, and even eliminate
in many situations, much of the litigation concerning perpetuity
problems. With some limited exceptions, litigation over perpetuity
questions cannot arise until the rule against perpetuities as defined
by the statute is violated. Consequently, all transfers which, over
time, become effective despite their technical potential invalidity
under the old common law rule will not produce litigation. Only a
transfer device that violates both period testing arms of the USRAP
will come before the court except as noted. Even when litigation
does occur, the nature and purpose of the litigation will be dramatically
different from much of the litigation under the current common
law rule, which derives its motivation from a desire to destroy the
contingent interest. Actions are brought by those who will gain by
the destruction of the transfer device. Under the USRAP, this type
of litigation is eliminated. The only litigation that will arise will be
litigation to reform an instrument to conform to the rule.
Consequently, only those who wish to settle legitimate concerns and
to terminate or to settle ownership of ancient trusts will be able to
seek court review. This feature of the USRAP should abolish the
common law attribute of granting unjust enrichment to nonintended
beneficiaries due to technical failure of transfers because of perpetuity
violations.
The USRAP specifically excludes certain transactions and powers
from application of its perpetuity rules.145 The provision provides
542. U.P.C. § 2-901 (1990) (amended 1993).
543. Id. § 2-901(a)(1).
544. Id. § 2-901(a)(2).
545. Id. § 2-904.
UALR LAW JOURNAL
that all exceptions recognized at common law or excluded by statute
are excluded under the USRAP.146 The USRAP then defines particular
situations that also are excluded.5 47 Generally, non-donative transfers
are not subject to the Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities . 4s Although
not excepted at common law, the position of the drafters of the
USRAP is that this is the preferred law because a perpetuity rule
that concerns gratuitous transfers is not appropriate to apply to
transactions with consideration. 49 Arkansas cases applying the rule
against perpetuities to repurchase options contained in a deed and
to independent options to purchase would be overruled. 50
The purpose of these exclusions is to draw particular divisions
between the types of transfers to which the Rule should apply versus
those to which it should not. The USRAP does not indicate that
other durational limitations should not be imposed on the excepted
transfers. The point being that the rule against perpetuities is the
wrong policy to apply against these devices and that particular
specialized durational limitations need to be developed for them.
G. Honorary Trusts
The honorary trust is loosely definable as an "intended trust
for a specific non-charitable purpose" where no beneficiary is actually
named and the designated purpose cannot be considered charitable. 5 '
The legality of these devices has been far from secure. The Code
546. Id. § 2-904(7).
547. Id. § 2-904(1-6).
548. Id. § 2-904(1). The USRAP codifies the common law determination that
nonvested charitable interests held in trust or by governmental entities are not
subject to the perpetuity period so long as they pass from one charitable entity
to another charitable entity. Id. § 2-904(5). Furthermore, with some particular
exceptions, nonvested property interests or powers of attorney in regard to trusts
or other arrangements dealing with pension, profit sharing, stock bonuses, and
other types of employee benefit arrangements are excepted from the Rule as well.
Id. § 2-904(6). Purely administrative or management powers that. are not related
to distribution are excepted from the Rule because they exist in trust instruments.
Id. § 2-904(2). In addition, a power to appoint a fiduciary, and a discretionary
trustee's power to distribute principal to an indefeasibly vested beneficiary are
excepted. Id. § 2-904(3)-(4).
So that the exclusion is not interpreted beyond its intent, however, the USRAP
excepts from the exclusion certain transactions that are in the nature of donative
transfers despite their nongratuitous characterization. This would include prenuptial
and postnuptial agreements, separation or divorce settlements, surviving spouse
elections, and other similar types of devices specifically enumerated.
549. Id. § 2-904 cmt.
550. See Otter Creek Dev. Co. v. Friesenhahn, 295 Ark. 318, 748 S.W.2d 344
(1988); Broach v. City of Hampton, 283 Ark. 496, 677 S.W.2d 851 (1984).
551. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. c (1959).
[Vol. 17:631
1995] ARKANSAS LAW AND UPC COMPARISON 725
in its optional section both legitimatizes and limits the duration of
such honorary trusts. 2
Under the Code, any transfer in trust that is for a lawful non-
charitable purpose, either as specified in the instrument or as selected
by the trustee, may be performed by the trustee regardless of whether
there is a beneficiary who can enforce or terminate the trust." 3 The
duration is set at twenty-one years and applies even if the instrument
contemplates a longer period.
The main importance of this section, if enacted by a state, is
that it permits a trustee to enforce these types of devices only for
a period of twenty-one years. The Code gives no guidance as to
what a non-charitable purpose is. Assumably it would include, for
example, trusts for the offering of masses and for the care of personal
individual grave sites.
Another provision included in the Code concerns a similar type
of transfer, i.e., the trust for pets.554 Pet owners commonly desire
that their pets be well cared for after their deaths. Transfers to and
trusts for the benefit of pets have sometimes been approved as
honorary trusts.5 5 The Code gives both recognition and definition
to these desires. It specifically permits assets to be transferred in
trust for the care of designated domestic or pet animals. 5 6 Although
validity is guaranteed under the provision, it limits the duration of
the trust to the lives of the covered animals living when the trust
is created 5 7 Instruments are to be liberally construed and extrinsic
evidence freely admitted to determine the transferor's intent. 58
Several administration provisions are included to regulate the
above transfer devices. Income and principal of the trust must be
used only for trust purposes or for covered animals unless the
instrument expressly provides otherwise.5 9 On termination, the trust
must be transferred according to its creation instrument or the
relevant clauses of the transferor's will or by intestacy. 6° The Code
makes the intent enforceable by the trustee or other court appointed
persons.5 6' A court may name a trustee, if none is designated or
552. U.P.C. § 2-907(a) (1990) (amended 1993).
553. Id.
554. Id. § 2-907(b).
555. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. d (1959).
556. U.P.C. § 2-907(b) (1990) (amended 1993).
557. Id.
558. Id.
559. Id. § 2-907(c)(1).
560. Id. § 2-907(c)(2); see id. § 2-711.
561. Id. § 2-907(c)(4).
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no one is willing to serve, and order transfer to another trustee in
order to see the intended use carried out.562 A court may adjust the
funds and order the excess distributed as it would be if the trust
ended.5 63
Because no reported Arkansas cases deal with honorary trusts,
the adoption of the Code would clarify the availability of them for
Arkansas's testators.
X. CONCLUSION
All interested persons are properly reluctant to support a change
in any law unless convinced that the new law will be an improvement.
The purpose of this article is to provide a general comparison of
Article II of the Code with existing Arkansas law. The central thesis,
supported by that comparison, is that the Code will substantially
improve Arkansas's substantive law of intestate succession, family
protection, wills, and other donative transfers. We should, therefore,
all support its adoption.
Despite what some might consider to be imperfections in the
Code, it is clearly the best legislative model both comprehensively
and individually. The Arkansas legislature needs to overcome pro-
vincialism and recognize the changes that have occurred in regard
to property ownership and transfer. The Code offers so much more
than current law. The Code is clearly a dynamic instrument of
reform deserving of wide support. Not only has property ownership
changed from an emphasis on real property to personal property,
but even the type of personal property has changed. We live in a
mobile, diverse society with a wide range of familiar relationships.
People believe that property transfers are private transactions not
requiring continual court or government regulation supervision or
intervention. Probate law needs to recorni7e te factors. The Code
provides that direction.
562. Id. § 2-907(c)(7).
563. Id. § 2-907(c)(6).
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